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Be not too tame neither, but let your own discretion be your tutor. Suit the action
to the word, the word to the action, with this special observance, that you o'erstep
not the modesty of nature. For anything so o'erdone is from the purpose of play-
ing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold, as 'twere, the mirror
up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very
age and body of the time his form and pressure.
Hamlet, III, ii, 11. 17-25.
All the characters in this book are fictitious, and any resemblance to actual persons
living or dead is purely coincidental.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1980, Master Sandier of the Ontario Supreme Court rendered
a decision on what might have seemed two rather innocuous procedural mat-
ters. 1 The first was an application by the defendants in a libel action to amend
their pleadings to buttress a defence that the plaintiff had no reputation to in-
jure. The second was an application by the plaintiff in the same action to com-
pel the defendant writer to reattend at discovery; the plaintiff wanted answers
to his questions. The matters in dispute had to do with sources the defendant
had consulted in preparing his manuscript. What makes this second aspect of
the motion so special, what lifts it out of the realm of procedural nicety, is that
this particular defendant happened to be a novelist - and, after Master
Sandler's decision, would be the first Canadian novelist ever ordered by a
court to reveal his sources. 2 "While there is protection against revelation of
sources for newspapers and reporters . . . It]here is no such protection for
novelists."
3
No precedent was cited for this blanket assertion regarding novelists.
Master Sandier reasoned that questions as to sources became relevant to one of
the defendant's pleadings, namely, that the novelist Ian Adams had not in-
tended his fictional character "S" to refer to the plaintiff, Leslie James Ben-
nett. 4 Malice and intention are only relevant when the defences of privilege and
fair comment are pleaded; neither had been pleaded in this case. 5 The lack-of-
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2 Overbury, Sue and be Dandy, Books in Canada, Nov. 1980, 3.
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intention pleading, then, was legal window dressing, although the defendants
might plead it with a view to mitigating damages if they wished. The "only real
liability issue," according to Master Sandler, was "the identity issue" - that
is, whether the character "S" was "capable of being understood to refer to the
plaintiff." 6 Because the defendants had made the source question of relevance
by pleading lack of intention to refer to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was entitled
to pursue answers so as to negative this plea. Hence, Ian Adams must be com-
pelled to answer questions about the source for his character "S" in the novel
S, Portrait of a Spy.
In an unsettling way, the decision makes technical sense of the law of libel
as it stands in Canada. If a defendant makes a false and defamatory statement
of fact, and does not plead privilege or fair comment, his lack of intention to
defame, just as his lack of intention to refer to the plaintiff, is irrelevant. 7
Bonafides is no defence. The regime is one of strict liability. "The question is
not so much who was aimed at as who was hit." 8
At a deeper level, however, the decision posits a singular absurdity, which
has to do with the idea of compelling a writer of fiction to reveal his sources.
Fiction does not have sources in the journalistic sense. Fictional characters are
composites, made in varying measure from the rag-and-bone shop of the
writer's own imagination, insight and experience. Fictional characters are not
meant to identify real people. But to allow a plaintiff to test this lack of inten-
tion through compulsion of sources is to say: "You did not mean to write fic-
tion at all, you meant to write fact. You identified me in your book because,
like your character, I too have asthma and worked as an intelligence officer for
the R.C.M.P. But, unlike your character, I was never a counter-agent for the
K.G.B. and the C.I.A. I was not a traitor to my country. 9 Because you got
your facts wrong, because in this particular and that I am not at all like the
character in your book, you have falsified and defamed me. You, Mr. Writer,
are liable precisely because there both was and was not enough truth to your
fiction. You are liable for writing fiction."
That is the inevitable absurdity of which Professor Kalven l0 wrote in his
seminal assessment of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,II when he spoke of the
"gossamer thread" on which the defendant's liability depends, a thread which
is made thinner by the way identifying truths and defamatory untruths are
pleaded: "There is revealed here a new technique by which defamation might
be endlessly manufactured. First, it is argued that, contrary to all appearances,
61d.
7 Gatley, Libel and Slander (8th ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 1981), at
para. 8; Klar, Developments in Tort Law: The 1978-79 Term (1980), 1 S.C.L.R. 312 at
324; Weiler, Defamation, Enterprise Liability, and Freedom of Speech (1967), 17
U.T.L. J. 278 at 280; Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20.8 Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 at 262 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1920).
9 This is a paraphrase of the actual pleadings of the plaintiff in Leslie James Ben-
nett v. Ian Adams and Gage Educational Publishing Limited, In the Supreme Court of
Ontario, Dec. 19, 1977, Action No. 20362177, amended statement of claim paras. 4, 5
and 6.
10 Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment, " [1964] Sup. Ct. Rev. 191 at 199.
11 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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a statement referred to the plaintiff; then, that it falsely ascribed to the plain-
tiff something that he did not do, which should be rather easy to prove about a
statement that did not refer to plaintiff in the first place." 
12
Master Sandier was correct when he said that the only real liability issue
was identity.13 Although, in a libel action, the plaintiff is required to prove
every element of the claim, 14 a suit involving fiction turns on the issue of iden-
tification.' 5 Had Leslie James Bennett succeeded in proving sufficient iden-
tification at trial, Ian Adams and his publisher Gage would have been virtually
without defence.
Justification, or the truth defence, is tactically foreclosed. It is unlikely
that any writer of fiction will admit that his creation was thinly disguised
fact. 16 The law of libel has never recognized a justification defence for the
"higher truths" of art 17 - the mirror-up-to-nature truths which may distort
surface details in pursuit of essential truths.
Nor is fair comment a viable defence. Although an argument can be made
for the extension of this defence when dealing with works of "faction"18 (a
novel derived from an admixture of fact and fantasy) as an "opinion" about
human motivation, literary novels which do not have a political thrust do not
really qualify as comment. 19 This defence is made even more unlikely by virtue
of the requirement that the comment be based substantially on true facts. 2
0 Re-
12 Supra note 10, at 199.
13 Supra note 1, at 243.
14 Duncan and Neill, Defamation (London: Butterworths, 1978) at para. 5.01:
(a) that the words complained of were published of him;
(b) that the words were defamatory of him; and
(c) that the words were published by the defendant or in circumstances in which
the defendant is responsible for the publication.
15 Wilson, The Law of Libel and the Art of Fiction (1981), 44 Law and Contem-
porary 27 at 33; Stare, Defamation in Fiction: The Case forAbsolute First Amendment
Protection (1981), 20 PEAL 70 at 86; Yayashi and Littlefield, Fiction Based on Fact:
Writers' Liability for Libel or Invasion of Privacy (1981), 14 U.C.D.L. Rev. 1029 at
1039; McCloskey, Suing the Artist for Libel - The Pendulum Swings Back (1982), 71
111. B.J., 124 at 128.
16Franklin and Trager, Literature and Libel (1982), 4 Comm/Ent. L.J. 205 at 214.
17 Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths" ofArt, and the First Amendment (1978), 126
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1065.
18 Id. at 1067-69. Professor Silver cites Robert Coover's The Public Burning as an
example of the genre.
19 Supra note 14, at para. 12.02:
The main principles relating to the defence of fair comment are as follows:
(a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest;
(b) the comment must be based on fact;
(c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognizable as
comment;
(d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any man honestly
express that opinion on proved facts?;
(e) even though the comment satisfied the objective test the defence can be
defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was actuated by express
malice.
20 Vander Zalm v. Times Publishers (1980), 12 C.C.L.T. 81 (B.C.C.A.), per
Nemetz C.J.B.C. at 213: "... the matter must be recognizable to the ordinary man as a
comment upon true facts.... "
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cent cases where the defence has been tested in more likely contexts are further
reason for scepticisri.
21
I will be discussing the defence of qualified privilege at greater length as
one area which might prove pliant in response to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.22 While the general principles may appear broad, their
application in Canada thus far has proved rather inflexible.23
The unavailability of traditional defences for the writer of fiction is at-
tested to by the fact that Ian Adams in the Bennett suit did not rely on them. 24
He argued primarily that the characters were fictional - written against a
background of public offices and institutions not belonging to anyone; and
secondarily, that the plaintiff did not have a reputation to injure by reason of
the circumstances surrounding his retirement from the R.C.M.P. after inter-
rogation relating to security activities. 25 We will never know how successful
those pleas might have been. The case settled out of court three years after the
writ was served, and before the appeal from Master Sandler's decision could
be heard. 26
If the motion before Master Sandler is any indication, it suggests a will-
ingness to treat fiction as non-fiction for the purpose of libel law - to treat it
as if it has a compellable source. This leaves the writer virtually without
defence. For once it is established that a character in a novel has a real-life
counterpart, it is a virtual certainty that the negative aspects of the portrayal
will "tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of
society generally." 27 That there must be negative aspects of the characteriza-
21 See e.g. Chernesky v. Armadale Publishers Ltd., [1978] 6 W.W.R. 618, 90
D.L.R. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
22 Part I (ss. 1-34) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Sched. B of the Canada Act 1982,
1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
23 Bolandv. Globe and Mail Ltd. (1960), 22 D.L.R. (2d) 277 (S.C.C.).24 Bennett, supra note 9, Statement of Defence of Ian Adams.
25 Id. at paras. 4, 7, 11.
26Gage settled with Leslie James Bennett for $30,000 on December 18, 1980
(Memorandum of Agreement, litigation file of Paul Copeland, counsel for Ian Adams).
A little known fact is that Gage held libel insurance with a $50,000 deductible. Because
the lawyer representing Gage was also the lawyer for the insurer, there was a real incen-
tive to settle, for fear that a judgment might involve the publisher in sums far in excess
of the deductible. In an agreement between Gage and Ian Adams, collateral to this set-
tlement, Adams became responsible for $10,000, which sum was to include Adams's
buy-back of the paperback rights. That collateral agreement has spawned further litiga-
tion between Adams and Gage. (Gage v. Adams, in the County Court of the Judicial
District of York, Nov. 10, 1981, Action No. 158362/81.) Thus, the consequences of the
Bennett suit are far from over. (Conversation with Paul Copeland, March 3, 1983). See
also Callwood, "Publish and Be Damned", Toronto Life, June 1982 at 30, in which
June Callwood describes the devastating impact that being sued has upon the writer.
One American commentator has suggested that, quite apart from a defendant's chances
regarding liability, the mere prospect of litigation acts as a procedural chill on the con-
stitutional freedom. (Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship (1975), 53 Tex. L.
Rev. 422.) Thus, a constitutional guarantee that operates to buttress a defence may be
operating at the wrong end of the spectrum.2
1Sim v. Stretch (1936), 52 T.L.R. 669, [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237 at 1240 per Lord
Atkin.
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tion, we know from the fact the plaintiff has filed suit. Fiction becomes
iibelous by its very nature. It is both truth, and non-truth. Well might the
writer here be tempted to say to the State as did the fool to King Lear:
"Pr'ythee, nuncle, keep a schoolmaster that can teach thy fool to lie: I would
fain learn to lie."' 2 Surely that is the message to writers of fiction: learn to lie
so completely that your art bears no traceable resemblance to reality, or do not
write at all. Do not make life one of your sources.
What can one say of a law which deprives a segment of its citizenry of its
defences? A new weight has been added to the balance - the constitutional
argument: 29
The law of defamation must strike a fair balance between the protection of reputa-
tion and the protection of free speech, for it asserts that a statement is not ac-
tionable, in spite of the fact that it is defamatory, if it constitutes the truth, or is
privileged, or is fair comment on a matter of public interest, expressed without
malice by the publisher. These defences are of crucial importance in the law of
defamation because of the low level of the threshhold which a statement must pass
in order to be defamatory .... This is the reason why most defamation actions
centre on the defences of justification, fair comment, or privilege. It is these
defences which give substance to the principle offreedom of speech.
[Emphasis added.]
What Mr. Justice Dickson called a "principle" in his well-reasoned dissent in
Cherneskey is now a constitutionally entrenched freedom. Ironically, this
freedom may be the fiction writer's only defence.
It is precisely because traditional defences in the law of defamation are
unworkable for fiction that the constitutional balance presents itself in starkest
relief: society's pervasive interest in preserving reputation and in seeing that a
person's name is not traduced with impunity, contrasted with society's equally
pervasive interest in seeing that freedom of expression - the "breath of
life" 30 of a constitutional democracy - is not infringed or denied without
demonstrable justification.
This paper addresses the special problems fiction creates for the law of
libel. Because the constitution argument is the law of libel's newest accretion,
some time will be spent discussing the Charter at a general level: the substan-
tive arguments which are likely to arise; theoretical bases underlaying freedom
of expression; the thorny issue of Charter application; and the way in which
American defamation law has responded to constitutional challenges. The
return journey will focus on the significant elements of the libel action as
regards fiction - notably, the issue of identification. I will then conclude with
the special claim of fiction to Charter protection, and a suggested test for
balancing the countervailing expressive and reputational interests through an
expanded defence of qualified privilege.
28 Shakespeare, King Lear I, iv.
29 Cherneskey, supra note 21, at 342-43, per Mr. Justice Dickson, dissenting.
30 Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81 at 133 (S.C.R.), 107
(D.L.R.) per Duff C.J. In the passage in which these words appear, it is political speech
to which Chief Justice Duff refers: "it is axiomatic that the practice of this right of free
discussion of public affairs, notwithstanding its incidental mischiefs, is the breath of life
for parliamentary institutions."
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II. BROAD OUTLINES OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT
One should begin by delineating, in broad brushstrokes, the outline of the
substantive arguments one is likely to hear.
The defendant will have raised all of his traditional tort defences -
qualified privilege, justification, fair comment, and so on. He will argue that
these defences are constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the
safeguards for freedom of expression that are required by section 2(b) of the
Charter. He may also argue that the burden of having to prove each ingredient
of his defence 3' is inconsistent with section 1 of the Charter, which appears to
place the burden squarely on the party who would claim that a limit upon a
fundamental freedom is "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society". 32 He may further argue that the presumption of malice as presently
framed is constitutionally deficient, again as a denial of his freedom of expres-
sion. 33 A similar argument might be made as regards the present rule of
31 Cherneskey, supra note 21, at 330per Ritchie J.
32This argument based on section 1 is slightly different from the one discussed
infra. The argument could be framed by analogy to recent reverse-onus cases under the
criminal law, notably the important Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Oakes
(1983), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 339, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 123. In R. v. Oakes, the legal issue was
whether section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1 offended the right
of an accused to be presumed innocent, as guaranteed by sub-section 11(d) of the
Charter. Martin J.A., speaking for a unanimous court of five judges, reasoned that a
reverse onus provision does not, per se, contravene the right to be presumed innocent,
provided that the particular reverse onus provision is a reasonable limitation of that
right. Id. at 362 (C.C.C.), 146 (D.L.R.). In determining whether a reverse onus provi-
sion is a reasonable limit, the court should consider three factors: 1. the magnitude of
the evil sought to be suppressed; 2. the difficulty of the prosecution making proof of
the presumed fact; and 3. the relative ease with which the accused may prove or
disprove the presumed fact. Id. at 362 (C.C.C.), 146 (D.L.R.). But even if section 8 of
the Narcotic Control Act were otherwise justifiable according to the above three
criteria, it could not be justified as a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter,
since it "casts upon the accused the burden of disproving not some formal element of
the offence but the burden of disproving the very essence of the offence." Id. at 363
(C.C.C.), 147 (D.L.R.). By analogy, one could argue that a civil rule of liability which
casts the burden on the defendant to prove that his opinion is not counterfeit or that his
motives are not malicious casts upon the defendant an impossible burden - the burden
of disproving the very essence of the libel. It reduces freedom of expression to a "mere
shadow," makes the guarantee "wholly illusory and fanciful." Id. at 353 (C.C.C.), 137
(D.L.R.).
Regarding burden of proof under the Charter, see generally Marx, "Entrenchment,
Limitations and Non-Obstante," in Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, eds., Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982), 61 at 68,
Conklin, Interpreting and Applying The Limitations Clause: An Analysis of Section 1
(1982), 4 Supreme Court L.R. 75.
33 "Malice" and "maliciously" aie used in a number of different contexts in the
law of defamation. When used in a statement of claim, a plea of maliciousness is, strictly
speaking, unnecessary. The falsity of defamatory words is presumed and the burden of
proving them true is placed on the defendant. Similarly, the publication of defamatory
words is presumed to be malicious. In this context, the word malicious does not imply a
state of mind or intention to defame. Intention is irrelevant. Duncan and Neill, supra
note 14, at paras. 17.01-02.
The second context in which malice is used is to defeat a defence of fair comment or
qualified privilege, and its meaning can be a source of confusion in Canada, as
epitomized by the majority and minority opinions in the Cherneskey decision, supra
note 21. In a sense, the majority never came to consider malice. It held that the defend-
ant newspaper had failed to prove affirmatively an element of its defence of fair com-
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damages. 34 The question for the court at this stage of the argument will be
whether the particular rule of liability, by its burdens, definitions of malice,
and so on, abridges freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Charter. This
question revolves around the meaning of section 2(b). Does the particular tort
rule of liability infringe or deny freedom of expression as guaranteed by that
section.
The plaintiff would counter the above by arguing, first, that there has
been no infringement or denial of a Charter right. Defamatory utterances are
not within the definitional ambit of what is meant by freedom of expression.
That is, defamatory statements of fact are not constitutionally protected ex-
pressions. Second, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies only
to governmental infringement of individual rights; it has no application in a
private dispute between private parties. Finally, even if the court overcomes
the application hurdle and further finds that freedom of expression has been
infringed or denied, that freedom is subject to such reasonable limits as can be
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". Laws against
defamation exist in all democratic societies. The Criminal Code provisions
against libe 35 are evidence of a social consensus that such laws are desirable,
and that comparable civil laws aimed at the protection of reputation are
reasonable limits, demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
36
ment - namely, its "honest belief" in the opinions expressed in the letter complained
of. Id. at 330 (D.L.R.), per Ritchie J. Dickson J. framed the issue differently. Once the
comment has been shown to be objectively fair, Dickson J. would shift the burden to
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was actuated by express malice: "Malice is not
limited to spite or ill will, although these are its most obvious instances. Malice includes
any indirect motive or ulterior purpose, and will be established if the plaintiff can prove
that the defendant was not acting honestly when he published the comment. This will
depend on all the circumstances of the case. Where the defendant is the writer or com-
mentator himself, proof that the comment is not the honest expression of his real opi-
nion would be evidence of malice. If the defendant is not the writer or commentator
himself, but a subsequent publisher, obviously this test of malice is inappropriate.
Other criteria will be relevant to determine whether he published the comment from
spite or ill will, or from any other indirect and dishonest motive." Id. at 346 (D.L.R.).
My point is that, depending on how they are framed, tests of "honesty of belief" and
"malice" may have a decided impact on the success of defences, hence on freedom of
expression. As one commentator has opined: "To require a defendant to prove that his
opinion was not counterfeit, or that the motives of the writer were not malicious, re-
quires the disproving of malice. The law should not assume malice on the part of a
defendant who expresses or publishes an objectively fair comment on a matter of public
interest. Quite to the contrary, he who alleges improper motives should have the full
burden of proving them." Klar, The Defence of "Fair Comment," 8 C.C.L.T. 149 at
154. These tests will undoubtedly involve some re-alignment under pressure from the
constitutional argument.
34"[Libel] is actionable without proof of damage, as general damages are
presumed." Linden, Canadian Tort Law (3d ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1982), 687.
35 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, sections 261-64.
36 It is to be hoped that the circularity of this argument will be recognized and
repudiated. The import of section 52 of the Charter is that any law must be justified
anew against the standard of the Supreme law of Canada. The mere existence of a law is
not its justification. However, in a recent decision on the constitutional validity of the
censorship provisions of The Theatres Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 498, an Ontario Divisional
Court came close to adopting this sort of analysis in relation to the requirement of
demonstrable justification: "Eight other provinces and many other free and democratic
countries have similar legislation. . . . Moreover, the federal criminal prohibition
against obscenity is evidence that there is and has been sufficient concern in this country
1983]
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Leaving aside for a moment the issue of the Charter's application, the
constitutional argument will revolve around an examination of section 1. Both
at the first stage (is there a breach?) and at the second stage (is the tort rule of
liability a reasonable limit?), the court will be confronted with a choice be-
tween two conflicting interests: tort law's interest in seeing that a person's
reputation is not traduced with impunity; and the constitutional commitment
to freedom of speech.
There will be no absolute choice. To ask whether defamation law is per se
unconstitutional as an abridgement of freedom of speech, is to ask the ques-
tion at far too general a level; just as to ask whether defamation law is a
"reasonable limit" is to pose a somewhat meaningless generality. Rather, it
will be a question of determining at what point along a continuum libel law im-
pinges on the constitutional guarantee - a question, in other words, of ad-
justing presumptions, burdens and elements of the traditional tort action so
that it accords with the constitutional guarantee. The substance and pro-
cedures of libel law must now be evaluated against the background of a con-
stitutional commitment. The question is, how will the balance be struck? What
principles will the court draw upon in prescribing limits to this freedom?
Professor Weiler has identified four criteria that can be adopted in rela-
tion to liability for defamation, depending on the relative importance our
society wishes to confer on the respective values of free speech and freedom
from defamation.
37
At one end of the scale, society can choose to impose strict liability for er-
roneous statements of fact which result in loss of reputation, regardless of
fault. This is our system as presently constituted. 38 A regime of strict liability
accords overriding weight to the interest in compensating persons for loss of
their reputation; in removing the deterrent from people who might wish to
about this problem to enact legislation to combat it. We are satisfied, therefore, that
some prior censorship of film is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society." Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society v. Ontario Board of Censors
not yet reported, Mar. 25, 1983 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at 11. Prior legislative activity, such as a
Criminal Code provision for libel, may be some evidence of social consensus, but it can
hardly be determinative of demonstrable justification - especially when one ap-
preciates that this legislation is itself open to challenge. See e.g. Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964), where the United States Supreme Court voided a state criminal libel
statute.
Compare the deference to legislative choice suggested by the Ontario censorship deci-
sion, with the powerful judgment of Martin J.A. in R. v. Oakes, supra note 32, at
362-63 (C.C.C), 146-47 (D.L.R): "Great weight must be given to Parliament's deter-
mination with respect to the necessity for a reverse onus clause in relation to some ele-
ment of a particular offence. Certainly, reverse onus clauses exist in other free and
democratic societies .... However, a reverse onus provision, even if otherwise justi-
fiable by the above criteria, cannot be justified as a reasonable limitation of the right to
be presumed innocent under section 1 of the Charter in the absence of a rational con-
nection between the proved fact and the presumed fact. In the absence of such a connec-
tion the presumption created is purely arbitrary." The analysis in R. v. Oakes rejects a
"frozen" approach to demonstrable justification, and instead seeks out an objective
test for determining rational connection which is at once wedded to the context and con-
stitutionally principled. Mere longevity or prior judicial endorsement of a law is not
conclusive of its demonstrable justification.
37 Weiler, supra note 7, at 330-32.
38 1d.
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enter public life; and in distributing losses using the enterprises most likely to
offend - those forums of public discussion, such as newspapers and the elec-
tronic media. The unfairness of this regime is that it requires one segment of
society to pay the cost of preserving a social value in which we are all vitally in-
terested. It limits constitutional protection to only those statements which can
be proven true. This intolerance for even marginal error tends to produce self-
censorship, by which we all ultimately lose.
39
A second criterion is to require proof of "fault" before attaching
liability - fault being the failure to exercise reasonable care in checking and
publishing statements which cause reputational loss. Although preferable to
the first model, the requirement of reasonableness still means that enterprises
of public discussion will bear the weight of miscalculation, or the juror's
assessment as to what constitutes reasonableness. The standard of reasonable-
ness does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. It is an uncertain
standard and, again, likely to result in prior-censorship.
40
Professor Weiler's third possible basis for liability is "actual malice."
This test excepts from constitutional protection the intentional telling of lies.
Hence, in New York Times,41 the United States Supreme Court created a
qualified privilege for any defamatory statement made of a public official or
of his official conduct, defeasible only upon proof of actual malice. A state-
ment is malicious when it is made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for whether it is true or false. The purpose of the New York Times
criterion was to found a rule of liability against the "background of a pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials." 
42
The fourth criterion in establishing liability for defamation is to accord an
absolute immunity for all political discussion - that is, to view freedom of ex-
pression as an absolute. To the extent that intentional communication of
falsehood can only be inferred circumstantially, there is always a danger that a
jury will impose liability for political opinion. This view of the constitutional
imperative places public interest in free and open debate above all other in-
terests the state might have in reputation. This is the minority position of Mr.
Justices Douglas and Black of the United States Supreme Court and can be
paraphrased in one sentence: "I take no law abridging to mean no law abridg-
39 New York Times, supra note 11 at 278, citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
at 153-54: "For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents...
he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected: and thus the State
will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as
well as obscene literature.... And the bookseller's burden would become the public's
burden...."
40 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 at 389 (1967), per Mr. Justice Brennan: "Even
negligence would be a most elusive standard, especially when the content of the speech
itself affords no warning of prospective harm to another through falsity. A negligence
test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess
the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a
name, picture or portrait."
41 Supra note 11.
42Id. at 270.
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ing." 43 The absolute test is intended to bring a broader range of expressions
within constitutional protection. It does so by viewing a wider sector of ac-
tivities as inherently governmental, and by including "a more extensive area of
expression" within the definition of "freedom of speech." 44
It is unknown whether Canadian courts will ever grant absolute immunity
to political discussion. But even if the forms of expression that can qualify for
constitutional protection are liberally defined, it is highly unlikely that all such
forms will be granted absolute immunity. The way in which section 1 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is framed makes it clear that the
rights and freedoms are not absolute.
The court is now the guardian not only of private character, but also of
freedom of expression. The choice of a civil rule of liability - the position the
court adopts along the continuum - will give both substance and parameter
to the constitutional freedom. It is to be hoped that, in choosing its criteria,
the court will remember: "Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from
the field of free debate." 45 In society, there exist many interests, and the free
exercise of one right can involve impingement on another. The court must be
the arbiter between these countervailing interests, for neither the writer nor the
defamed individual "can be trusted to define the freedom of the other." 46 The
court's power is to define both freedoms through interpreting the Constitu-
tion. The question is, where will it look for guidance in its attempt to for-
mulate legal doctrine? The next part of this paper will explore American and
Canadian theoretical bases for freedom of speech.
III. AMERICAN THEORETICAL BASES FOR THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 47
Traditional theory of freedom of expression begins with this purposive
approach of Mr. Justive Holmes in his celebrated dissent in Abrams v. United
States 48
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposi-
tion... But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -
43See e.g., Black, The Bill of Rights (1960), 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 865 at 867. (This
paraphrase was coined by Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, [1961]
Sup. Ct. Rev. 245 at 246.
'Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1966) at 56-58.
45 New York Times, supra note 11, at 272, citing Judge Edgerton in Sweeney v. Pat-
terson, 128 F. 2d457 at 458 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942).
46 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems (1971), 47 Ind.
L.J. 1 at3.
47 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
48250 U.S. 616 at 630 (1919).
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that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Thus expressed, freedom of speech is valuable, first of all, as a means to an
end - the better attainment of truth. The "marketplace of ideas" argument,
described in the language of the American capitalist enterprise, expresses a
kind of Darwinian faith in the power of truth to win acceptance in the market,
given the chance to compete. The danger of this theory is that it may lead to its
opposite - that perceived falsehood immediately puts a different cast on the
constitutional question: "Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may
further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that
the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should
enjoy a like immunity." 
49
Hence is borne the category approach to the First Amendment - the
calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which "are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality." 50 Included in the category approach
as unprotected speech we find "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words." 51 Once defined, these classes
of speech prove remarkably resilient.
52
Apart from its tendency to spawn categories of speech which do not fall
within protection, the problem with the "marketplace of ideas" theory is that
the right to differ about what is "the truth" may be subtly endangered. 53 No-
tions of falsity pose particular dangers for the artist. Just as an immoral man
can tell a moral tale (Chaucer, "The Pardonner's Prologue", The Canterbury
Tales), the poetic "lie" can be the vehicle of truth. The interplay of truth and
illusion is one of the classic themes of literature. In Thomas Mann's Felix
Krull, the narrator contemplates the actor in his dressing room, now stripped
of his paint. The "truth" is a pimpled individual, a "repulsive worm" who a
moment ago on stage was "the glorious butterfly". The contrast is so marked
that Felix Krull is moved to inquire: "which is the 'real' shape of the glow-
worm; the insignificant little creature crawling about on the flat of your hand,
or the poetic spark that swims through the summer night? Who would
presume to say?"
poetic spark that swims through the summer night? Who would presume to
say?"
49 Garrison, supra note 36 at 75 (1964).
5 0 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 572 (1941).
51 Id.
52 After years of role repetition of the categorical approach, its sudden scrutiny in
New York Times, supra note 11, must have seemed unexpected indeed. The tenor of the
New York Times rejection is that a mere label of state law cannot end the constitutional
debate: ". . . libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Id. at 269.
53Tribe, American Constitutional Law (New York: The Foundation Press, 1978) at
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The danger for the artist is that, in puritan times, the law might presume
to pass judgment on what is truth. A theory of freedom of expression which
leaves "lies" unprotected as having minimal social utility could easily be ex-
tended to comprehend poetic lies.
A second theory of freedom of speech sees the First Amendment within
the narrower perspective of its political function. Free speech is protected as
essential to informed self-government: The First Amendment "protects the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we
'govern.' It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a
governmental responsibility." 54 According to Alexander Meiklejohn, the most
frequently cited proponent of this theory, literature and the arts are protected
because they have a social importance, which he calls a "governing" impor-
tance.5 5 "People need novels and drama and paintings and poems because they
will be called upon to vote." 56 They "must be self-educated in the ways of
freedom." 57 Literature feeds into this theory as a function of the informed
vote. It is a form of thought and expression from which the "voter derives the
knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values; the capacity for sane and
objective judgment which, . . . a ballot should express." 58 Professor Tribe's
criticism of this theory is that it is a partial view; it tells us disappointingly lit-
tle.59 It does not tell us, for instance, why self-government is to be valued. It is
too rational, too political to accommodate the cry of impulse, the expression
of self which has no ostensible purpose beyond expression. 6
An answer to Professor Tribe's question - why self-government, why
democracy, at all? - is suggested by Mr. Justice Brandeis' philosophical at-
tempt to lay down a comprehensive theory of the First Amendment: 6'
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to
make men free to develop their faculties and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as
a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth;
that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
54 Meiklejohn, supra note 43, at 255.
55 Id. at 262.
56 Id. at 263.
57Id.
58 Id. at 256.
59 Supra note 53, at 578.
6 Hannah Arendt, in her reflections on thinking describes the urge toward "self-
display" as a developmental movement toward epiphany: "Seen from the viewpoint of
the spectators to whom it appears and. from whose view it finally disappears, each in-
dividual life, its growth and decline, is a developmental process in which an entity un-
folds itself in an upward movement until all its properties are fully exposed; this phase is
followed by a period of standstill - it's bloom, or epiphany, as it were - which, in
turn, is succeeded by the downward movement of disintegration that is terminated by
complete disappearance." Arendt, "Reflections: Thinking - 1", The New Yorker,
Nov. 21 1977, 65 at 82. From this philosophical perspective, self-expression might be
seen as one of the goals of life.
61 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 at 375-76 (1927).
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discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental princi-
ple of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human in-
stitutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate;
that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument
of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing ma-
jorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed.
Freedom of expression is both an end and a means, as is democracy both
an end and a means. Through democracy, we make men free to develop their
faculties, and the quality of the democracy that results is necessarily incidental
to the quality of their freedom. To silence the individual is not only to diminish
his life - that developmental process toward his own epiphany - it is a
silence by which we are all, somehow, diminished, cut off from the kind of
society we might have been.
Mr. Justice Brandeis's words posit a vision of the First Amendment which
sees freedom of expression as a constitutive part of both individual and
societal liberty. It may not help us to delineate the boundaried world within
which expression is to be protected and outside of which it is not, but it at least
points to the dangers of a partial view - an almost existential silence: "The
argument of force in its worst form." 62
IV. CANADIAN THEORETICAL BASES: FREEDOM GOVERNED BY
LAW
Even before freedom of expression was entrenched in Canadian constitu-
tional law, our courts found the theoretical bases for it implicit in the preamble
to the Constitution Act, 1867.63 According to Duff C.J. and Cannon J. writing
in Re Alberta Statutes64 the preamble showed plainly that the Constitution of
Canada was to be similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, which
meant a parliament working under the influence of public opinion and public
discussion: 65 "it is axiomatic that the practice of this right of free public
discussion of public affairs, notwithstanding its incidental mischiefs, is the
breath of life for parliamentary institutions." Cannon, J. further rooted
62 Id.
63 30&31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
64 Supra note 30. In Re Alberta Statutes, the Press Bill was part of a general scheme
of Social Credit legislation which dealt, in the main, with taxation of banks and con-
solidation of credit in Alberta. This omnibus legislation was held ultra vires the province
on federalism grounds, and the Press Bill fell as ancillary and dependent legislation.
Hence, the statements Duff C.J. and Cannon J. regarding liberty of the press and the
right of public discussion are obiter.
65 Id. at 133 (S.C.R.), 107 (D.L.R.), per Duff C.J., at 146 (S.C.R.), 119 (D.L.R.),
per Cannon J.
66 Id.
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freedom of speech in a concept of democracy: "Freedom of discussion is
essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic state.... Democracy can-
not be maintained without its foundation: free public opinion and free discus-
sion throughout the nation of all matters affecting the state within the limits
set by the criminal code [sic] and the common law." 67
But both Cannon, J. and Duff, C.J. recognized that there were competing
societal values. What is meant by freedom of speech is freedom "governed by
law."' 68 The right is subject to legal restrictions, "those based upon considera-
tions of decency and public order, and others conceived for the protection of
various private and public interests with which, for example, the laws of
defamation and sedition are concerned." 69
In view of the Charter, Re Alberta Statutes is enlightening in two
respects. 70 It is an early attempt to import a notion of freedom of expression
into the Canadian context. It suggests two tests for determining when that
freedom is abridged or denied.
The first test is what we might term a "traditional forms test." Any at-
tempt to abrogate the right of public debate, or to suppress "the traditional
forms" of its exercise, (for example, public meetings and the press) would be
ultra vires the provinces. 71 Secondly, while some degree of regulation of
newspapers "everybody would concede to the Provinces," 7 2 there is a limit to
that regulation. The limit is reached "when the legislation affects such a cur-
tailment of the exercise of the right of public discussion as substantially to in-
terfere with the working of the parliamentary institutions of Canada .... ',73
The reasoning is "principled." It rests on a foundation. 74 But like Mr.
Justice Holmes' "market place of ideas" theory, one might regard this reading
as a partial view. From the perspective of Re Alberta Statutes, freedom of
67 d. at 145-46 (S.C.R.), 119 (D.L.R.).
68 1d. at 133 (S.C.R.), 107 (D.L.R.).
69Id.
70For the relevance of pre-Charter caselaw, see generally Finkelstein, The
Relevance of Pre-Charter Caselaw for Post-Charter Adjudication (1982), 4 Supreme
Court L.R. 267.
7 1 Supra note 30, at 134 (S.C.R.), 108 (D.L.R.).
72 Id.
73Id.
74 The genesis for the theory that a legal basis for freedom of speech could be "im-
plied" from the Preamble to the Canada Act, 1867 is to be found in the dicta of Duff,
C.J. and Cannon J. in Re Alberta Statutes, supra note 30. The reasoning was that the
Preamble showed plainly that the Canadian constitution was to be similar in principle to
that of the United Kingdom, and that this contemplated a parliament working under the
influence of public opinion and public discussion. This reasoning is open to criticism,
for the very implication of rights suggests that Courts have competence to scrutinize
legislation on other-than federalism grounds. British constitutional principles, based on
the notion of parliamentary supremacy, would seem not to admit of court-imposed
restrictions on legislative action, except on federalism grounds. For a brief description
of the rise and fall of the implied bill of rights theory, see Skarsgard, Freedom of the
Press: Availability of Defences to a Defamation Action (1981), 45 Sask. L. Rev. 287 at
293-94.
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speech is to be regarded as a means to an end - successful parliamentary
government. It is, in other words, a political instrument.
75
In 1953, Rand J. in Saumur v. City of Quebec76 took the theory a step fur-
ther. Freedom of speech, religion and the inviolability of the person are
"original freedoms which are at once the necessary attributes and modes of
self-expression of human beings and the primary conditions of their communi-
ty life within a legal order." 77 By "original freedom", Rand J. may merely
have meant that one need not point to a legal rule by which to justify the asser-
tion of freedom of speech. 78 That he probably meant more, meant, like Mr.
Justice Brandeis, to posit a broader theory of freedom of expression which was
tied to man's humanity - his "thinking propensities" 79 - is supported by
this eloquent exposition when he again took up the theme in Switzman v.
Elbling: 80
Parliamentary government postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under
self-restraint, to govern themselves; and that advance is best served in the degree
achieved of individual liberation from subjective as well as objective shackles....
Liberty in this is little less vital to man's mind and spirit than breathing is to his
physical existence.
Stopping only at perimeters where the foundation of the freedom is itself
threatened, Rand, J. would leave "the literacy, discursive and polemic use of
language, in the broadest sense, free".
8 1
75 This understanding of a free press as a political instrumentality was recently
echoed by Mr. Justice Dickson, dissenting in Gay Alliance v. Vancouver Sun, [1979] 4
W.W.R. 118, 97 D.L.R. (3d) 577 at 601: "Newspapers occupy a unique place in western
society. The press has been felicitously referred to by de Toqueville as 'the chief
democratic instrument of freedom.' Blackstone wrote, 'The liberty of the press is in-
deed essential to the nature of a free state.' Jefferson went so far as to assert, 'Were it
left for me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.'
There is a direct and vital relationship between a free press and a free society."
76 Saumurv. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641. In Saumur,
by a narrow margin of five to four, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a provincial
by-law restricting the distribution of pamphlets in Quebec city streets without prior per-
mission of the Chief of Police was ultra vires the province. The five majority judges
classified the law as in relation to either speech or religion, but only three of the five,
Rand, Kellock and Lock, cited the dicta of Duff and Cannon J.J. in Re Alberta Statutes
as basis for their holding that the subject-matter of the by-law was beyond the legislative
power of the Province. The four dissenting judges classified the by-law as in relation to
the use of the streets and within the competence of the provincial legislature.
77 Id. at 329.
78 This meaning of original freedom is suggested by Bushnell, Freedom of Expres-
sion - The First Step (1977), 15 Alta. L. Rev. 93 at 121n.
79 Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 275, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 377 at 305 (S.C.R.), 357
(D.L.R.): "The aim of the statute is, by means of penalties, to prevent what is con-
sidered a poisoning of men's minds, to shield the individual from exposure to dangerous
ideas, to protect him, in short, from his own thinking propensities."
80 Id. In Switzman, the Supreme Court of Canada held by a majority of eight to
one that a Quebec law authorizing the padlocking of any house used to propogate com-
munism or bolshevism was ultra vires the province. The one dissenting opinion of
Taschereau J. classified that law as in relation to property and would have upheld it on
that basis. Five of the eight majority judges were of the view that a statute creating
penalties for its breach was legislation in respect of criminal law and hence ultra vires
the province. Only three of the eight majority judges - Rand, Kellock and Abbott JJ.
held that the law was in relation to freedom of speech and ultra vires on that basis.
81Id.
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This reading of freedom of expression as "original", as an end in itself
and as an expression of the sort of society we wish to become, is further
substantiated by the law which was found to offend in Saumur - a law for-
bidding distribution of pamphlets on Quebec's city streets without prior per-
mission from the Chief of Police. What is offensive about that law is that it
represents a prior or antecedent restraint. 82 Prior restraint is insidious, apart
from the breadth of its operation, in that it stunts the developmental pro-
cess - that "steadily advancing enlightenment, for which the widest range of
controversy is the sine qua non."' 83 If a freedom is original, it is part of our
primary condition as human beings. It cannot be stifled without, in some
sense, stifling our humanity.
One might ask at this point, is there a difference between a governmental
attempt to enact an antecedent restraint, (such as a prior licensing law to per-
mit speech on only certain occasions), and the application by the courts of a
civil law which has the ultimate effect of inhibiting debate? If prior censorship
is an unreasonable limit which cannot be justified in a free and democratic
society, is not a civil rule of liability which compels society's critics to
guarantee the truth of their factual assertions or to bear the burden of proving
them true not a comparable prior-restraint?84
It was under pressure from this kind of thinking, thinking about fun-
damentals, about the bases of our freedoms, that defamation law underwent
its radical reassessment in New York Times. It does not take much by way of
prediction to anticipate an equally profound reassessment under the Charter.
And yet, will the reassessment be all that radical? Are the roots of it not
already there?
V. THE THRESHOLD ISSUE: APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER
Section 24(1) provides that:
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been in-
fringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
At first reading, this provision would appear to contemplate proceedings not
only against governments, but by one individual against another. The use of
the word "anyone" supports a reading of section 24 as essentially a request for
enforcement of a personal right.
85
82 Supra note 76, at 330 (S.C.R.), 671 (D.L.R.).
83 Id.
84New York Times, supra note 11, at 279: "A rule compelling the critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions - and to do so on pain
of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount - leads to a comparable 'self-
censorship.' Allowance of the defence of truth, with the burden of proving it on the
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred... Under such a rule,
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to
make only statements which 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone'."
81 There are other sections of the Charter which, on their face, refer to individual
rights without requiring any state or governmental action. The fundamental rights sec-
tion (section 2) uses "[elveryone." Section 6(1) protects the right of "[e]very citizen of
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If "everyone" has certain fundamental freedoms, and "anyone" whose
freedoms have been infringed or denied can apply to a court, then the Charter
would seem to apply in actions between one individual against another. If a
plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have the means to vindicate and
maintain it. Indeed, "it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for
want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal."
8 6
Those who espouse the contrary and more orthodox position, that the
Charter should be confined to relations between the State and individuals and
not intrude into the area of relationships between individuals themselves, root
their arguments in Section 32(1):
This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within
the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory
and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters
within the authority of the legislature of each province.
The view expressed before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitu-
tion, for instance, was that the Charter "addresses itself only to laws and rela-
tionships between the state and individuals, it does not attempt to deal with
private relationships ...... 87
If the exclusion of private-activity is not clear enough from section 32,
those who espouse this limitation make reference to basic principles of con-
stitutional law: A constitution protects individuals from government in its
rule-making and rule-applying capacity.88 It defines the relationship between
the citizen and the State.
This "State-action" requirement rests on important premises.8 9 It leaves
Canada . . . to enter, remain in and leave Canada." Sections 7 and 8 protect
"[e]veryone's" right to "life, liberty, and security of the person" and "the right to be
secure against unreasonable search and seizure." Section 12 again protects the right of
"[e]veryone... not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment.. ." Secton 15
provides that "[e]very individual is equal before and under the law without discrimina-
tion . . ." Section 11 uses the term "any person." These uses of "anyone," "any per-
son," "every individual" throughout the Charter would seem to support a view that the
Charter, as a whole, contemplates proceedings between individual litigants, without the
antecedent requirement of state action. See Swinton, "Application of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms," in Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, eds., supra note 32 at
45. Swinton, after envisioning the possibility of this linguistic argument, goes on to
espouse the opposite view. A counter-argument to the one based on the language of
these sections, is to say that the words used indicate who can assert a claim, not against
whom a claim can be asserted. Section 32 provides for that latter half of the equation,
and obviates the need to have inserted into each of these sections the words "by govern-
ment or state actors."
86Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts and
Technology (1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 142, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 707, at 147 (O.R.), 712 (D.L.R.),
per Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, citing Holt C.J. in Ashby v. White (1703), 92 E.R.
126 at 136.
87 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, (January 29, 1981),
Testimony of Mr. F.J.E. Jordan, Senior Counsel, Public Law, Federal Department of
Justice, 48:27.
88 Tribe, supra note 53 at 1147.
89 As used by Tribe, "state action" means action by any level of government from
local to national. Id. at 1147n.
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open a spectrum of private activity in which the individual knows he will be
free to make certain choices, such as choices about how and with whom he will
contract. The State-action requirement may even reinforce principles of
federalism and the separation of powers, by leaving free a zone of action
within which provinces may validly legislate - for instance, in relation to
property and civil rights in the province - laws conceived for the protection
of various private interests. 90
This public/private dichotomy is illustrated by traditional thinking of the
tort of defamation. Lies told about a person would be outside the constitu-
tional protection of freedom of expression, as the community has no interest
in the spread of falsehood. There is nopublic interest in lies.
91
I suggest that the Charter is not to be so limited. There are other sections
which bear upon the issue.
First, and most importantly, section 32 must be read in the light of section
52, which provides for the primacy of the Constitution of Canada over any law
of Canada:
92
s. 52 The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the incon-
sistency, of no force or effect.
That "any" law would include common law is hardly controversial. 93 Only the
narrowest conception of jurisprudence would confine the notion of "law" to
what is written in statute books. 94
One could argue that the Charter is activated whenever a court purports
to apply "any law" - be that law a civil rule of liability or a statutory
rule - which is inconsistent with the supreme law of Canada.
The second question is whether section 24 is to be read as subject to sec-
90Id. at 1149. Professor Tribe's second argument is probably more applicable in
the American context, where the state action requirement limits the range of wrongs
which-the federal judiciary may right in the absence of congressional action.
91 Bushnell, supra note 78, at 104.
92 Part VII of the Constitution Act, 1982, Sched. B of the Canada Act 1982, 1982,
c. 11, s. 52 (U.K.).
93 Tribe, supra note 53 at 1168; Hogg, Canada Act 1982 Annotated (Toronto:
Carswell, 1982) at 105.
94This argument is further buttressed by the preamble to the Charter: "Whereas
Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of
law." According to Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (10th ed., reprint 1959 ed.,
E.C.S. Wade, ed. London: Macmillan, 1965) the rule of law embraces at least three
components: First, it means "the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law
as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power." Id. at 202. In other words, "no man is
punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the
land." Id. at 188. Second, the rule of law implies that no man is above the law, but that
"every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the
realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals." Id. at 192. The third
sense in which rule of law may be described is on general principles of the constitution,
which are, according to Dicey, "the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of
private persons in particular cases brought before the courts." Id. at 195. British con-
stitutionalism is, in other words, "the result of the ordinary law of the land." Id. at 203.
That Dicey meant "ordinary law" to include the common law is clear from the above
three meanings he ascribed to the rule of law.
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tion 32 or to section 1. Recall that section 1 provides that the Charter
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it, subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society. Conversely, section 32, the application section, does
not use the word "only" - does not provide that the Charter applies only to
the parliament and government of Canada and to the legislatures and govern-
ment of each province. Some meaning must be given to the word "only" - its
presence in section 1 and significant absence from section 32. The author
argues that section 1 sets out the only limit upon the constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms.
95
Thirdly, section 1 has a leading importance, not only because of its lead
position in the Charter, but also because of its intention - to make explicit
that the Charter guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it. Unless that
"guarantee" is to be an empty shell of good intentions, that word, too, must
be given some meaning. What does it mean to have guaranteed a freedom if it
is circumscribed by the fortuitous circumstances in which the freedom at-
tempts to assert itself? Is this guarantee to have limits other than the one limit
set out in section 1? Are we now to accept that freedom of expression has a sec-
ond limit - the second being a limit of application? If that is the case, then
this "guarantee" is a paper currency of little worth.
Fourthly, there is the question of the meaning to be given to a description
of these freedoms as "fundamental". The theoretical bases have already been
explored above. At a minimum, "fundamental" could mean fundamental to
the functioning of democracy - as a political instrument. It could also mean
"fundamental" as an expression of man's essential humanity. But is it consis-
tent with the meaning of "fundamental" that a freedom should change its
character depending on whether the State or an individual is the principal
actor?
Fifthly, while proponents of the narrow reading of the Charter's applica-
tion9 cite American "state action" doctrine in support of their contention that
governmental activity is a condition precedent to constitutional scrutiny, ex-
amination of that doctrine shows that it is a fertile source for proponents of
the opposite view.
Exploration of this complex and innovative body of law is beyond the
competence of this paper. Suffice it to say here that American "state action"
doctrine has been extended to comprehend a broad range of activities. It ex-
tends, for instance, to embrace private activities which are seen to have a
"public function." 97 That is, the actions of seemingly private actors may be in-
95 See Conklin, Interpreting and Applying the Limitations Clause: An Analysis of
Section 1 (1982), 4 Supreme Court L.R. 75 at 77.
96 Hogg, supra note 93, at 77; Swinton, supra note 85, at 54.
97 In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), for instance, the United States
Supreme Court reversed a state trespass conviction incurred when a Jehovah's Witness
attempted to distribute religious literature in a company town. The question was
whether the people who lived in Chickasaw could be denied freedom of the press and
religion simply because a single company had legal title to all the town. Justice Black
had no trouble in holding that the state's interest in protecting private property rights
failed to justify the constitutional infringement: "had the people of Chickasaw owned
all the homes, and all the stores, and all the streets, and all the sidewalks, all those
owners together could not have set up a municipal government with sufficient power to
pass an ordinance completely barring the distribution of religious literature." Id. at 505.
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herently governmental and thus subject to constitutional limitation. State ac-
tion doctrine has forced American courts to confront difficult questions about
whether a positive concept of liberty may make governments accountable for
failure to act. 98 There may even be state action whenever government ac-
quiescence in private action amounts to ratification of that action. 99
Thus, recourse to "state action" doctrine to support a narrow reading of
the application of the Charter may in fact erode the neat dichotomy between
public and private by forcing a creative recasting of the question in a constitu-
tional mode.
If the above arguments are accepted, why, might one ask, was section 32
included in the Charter at all?
By analogy to the canon of statutory construction that the Crown is not
bound by a statute unless expressly stated,100 it is argued that section 32 was
written into the Charter in order to make its application to government une-
quivocal, not to limit its application solely to government or State actors.
When the question arose in New York Times as to whether common law
defamation could be state action, the Court showed no hesitation whatsoever
in subjecting that law to constitutional scrutiny. After reading that decision
and appreciating its impact on American libel law, it becomes difficult to see
how the threshold issue regarding the application of our Charter will be
anything other than academic in several years. As will be expected of Canadian
plaintiffs, the plaintiff in New York Times had raised the argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment' 01 was directed against state action and not private ac-
tion. Mr. Justice Brennan disposed of that submission at the outset:
98 Tribe, supra note 53, at 1150.
"In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), a private
restauranteur had formulated a rule that no blacks would be served in his restaurant.
The restaurant was located in a publicly owned and operated car parking building. The
Supreme Court found sufficient physical and financial integration of the restaurant into
the building to establish a nexus between the restaurant and the public parking authority.
It found further that the parking authority was the state in one of its manifestations.
Through the parking authority's inactivity, the state became a party to the refusal of
service. Id. at 725.
See also Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), where it was argued, albeit unsuc-
cessfully, that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant was an unconstitu-
tional form of state action: if a legislature cannot enforce racially restricted land
transfers, then a court, which is a manifestation of the state, cannot either. Id. at 324.
The argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. Id. at 331. But see Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), where it was held that a state court could not enforce a racially
restrictive covenant (in this case, a restrictive covenant prohibiting the sale of houses to
blacks) without offending the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judicial enforcement of such a covenant would be state action. The decision has,
however, been viewed with suspicion. See Tribe, supra note 53, at 1168.
100 The Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23, s.16 reads:
No enactment is binding on Her Majesty or affects Her Majesty's rights or
prerogatives in any manner, except only as therein mentioned or referred to.
101 The First Amendment by its terms ("Congress shall make no law . . .") was
originally addressed only to action by the Federal Government. But this limitation has
long since been eliminated through the intermediary of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
giving content to the due process clause of the Fourteenth, American Courts have looked
to the Bill of Rights for guidance, so that many of the rights guaranteed by the first
eight Amendments have been selectively absorbed into the Fourteenth. It is now beyond
question that the First Amendment applies equally to the States. Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652"at 666 (1925); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 at 707 (1931); New York
Times, supra note 11, at 253-54; Tribe, supra note 53, at 567.
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That proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of
speech and press. It matters not that the law has been applied in a civil action and
that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute.... The test is not the
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such
power has in fact been exercised. 102
The first step toward New York Times has already been taken in
Canada - the constitutionalizing of the concept of free speech. It remains to
be seen whether Canadian courts will begin the arduous process of reinventing
the wheel, starting with grants of "talismanic immunity" from consitutional
scrutiny simply because of the form in which the law is expressed, or whether
our courts will recognize that the question which should trigger Charter ap-
plication is whether State power in the form of "any law" has in fact been
exercised.
VI. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY THROUGH NEW YORK
TIMES AND GERTZ10
3
A. The Public Plaintiff
New York Times v. Sullivan arose when the police commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama brought a civil libel action against four black Alabama
clergymen and the New York Times Company. The police commissioner alleged
that statements published in the Times in a full-page advertisement soliciting
contributions for Dr. Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement in the
South, and impliedly condemning the performance of local law-enforcement
officials, had libeled him. Interestingly, none of the statements mentioned the
Police Commissioner by name. The Commissioner argued that the allegations
contained in the avertisement against the "police" were sufficient reflection
upon him in his official capacity to satisfy the "of and concerning" require-
ment.
Even more interesting was the uncontroverted fact that in several par-
ticulars the statements were not absolutely accurate. The advertisement had
protested, with exaggerations, the activities of the police in "ringing" the cam-
pus; padlocking the dining hall in order to starve students into submission; ar-
resting Dr. King seven times; bombing the King home; assaulting his person;
and charging him with perjury. Although the statements were not absolutely
accurate, it is clear from the court's juxtaposition of each inaccuracy beside its
originating fact, that there was a grain of truth to every exaggeration. 14 For
instance, although the police at no time literally "ringed" the campus, police
had been deployed near the campus in large numbers; and although Dr. King
had not been arrested seven times, he had been arrested four times.
Alabama law provided for a strict liability on the part of a publisher for
any defamatory falsehood, and recognized no privilege for good faith
mistakes of fact. Once it was established that the words tended to injure a per-
son in his reputation or to bring him into public contempt, and once it was
found that the words were "of and concerning the plaintiff," then "libel per
se" was established. A defence of fair comment would then depend on the
102 Supra note 11, at 265.
103 Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
104New York Times, supra note 11, at 258-59; Kalven, supra note 10, at 199.
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truth of the facts upon which the comment was based, and truth was rigorously
construed. Unless the publisher could discharge the burden of proving truth in
all its particulars, general damages were presumed. Good motives or honest
belief in truth did not negate the inference of malice, but were relevant, if at
all, only in mitigation of punitive damages. 105 Alabama law, in other words,
looked very much the way Canadian libel law looks today. 1
06
The first question the Court addressed was whether this rule of liability,
as applied to an action brought by a public official against critics of his official
conduct, abridged the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. That first question is comparable to the in-
itial substantive issue our courts will have to consider in a Charter analysis of
defamation law: does a strict rule of liability offend freedom of expression as
guaranteed by section 2(b)?
In reaching an affirmative answer on the first question, the Court rejected
the prevailing view that libel was a category of speech beneath constitutional
protection. As mentioned above, the Court dismissed the categorical approach
by stating that mere labels of state law could not foreclose constitutional
scrutiny. 1
07
Drawing upon the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. Califor-
nia,10 8 Mr. Justice Brennan posited the basic proposition that freedom of ex-
pression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment: "Thus we
consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 109
Once the prima facie case for constitutional protection was established,
Mr. Justice Brennan moved to the second issue, which in argument under our
Charter would be equivalent to a shift from section 2(b) to section 1.110 The
question then became whether the advertisement "forfeits that protection by
the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of
respondent.""'
Having surmounted the low threshold test on the first issue, the Court
might have been expected to answer the second question with a simple
negative. Instead, what one finds is a discursive treatment of the issue, ranging
from philosophic consideration of the Sedition Act of 1798, through the chill-
ing effects of censorship, to the inhibiting effect of damage awards under the
115 For Alabama law, see generally New York Times, id. at 267.
1
06 Supra note 7.
10 7 Supra note 11, at 269 and at 265.
101 Supra note 61.
1o9 Supra note 11, at 270.
"0 For an example of this two-tiered analysis under the Charter, see Rauca v.
Federal Republic of Germany (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 225 at 240 (Ont. C.A.): "First, it has
to be determined whether the guaranteed fundamental right or freedom has been in-
fringed, breached or denied. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then it
must be determined whether the denial or limit is a reasonable one demonstrably
justifiable in a free and democratic society."
"'New York Times, supra note 11, at 271.
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Alabama rule. What the Supreme Court seemed to be doing was searching for
a rule which would permit a margin of.good faith error in public discussion but
at the same time, leave open an avenue of recourse to the courts for victims of
defamatory statements made with actual malice. 112 The Court in New York
Times was engaged, in other words, in just the sort of balancing one would ex-
pect to find under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
a probing of what rule of liability would constitute a reasonable limit upon
freedom of speech, a drawing of the line between speech unconditionally
guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated - a wedding, in
other words, of ends and means.
The rule Mr. Justice Brennan articulated in New York Times is as follows:
The constitutional guarantees require... a federal rule that prohibits a public of-
ficial from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice" - that is, with knowledge that it was false or vith reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
113
As applied to the facts of the case, the evidence failed to show with the "con-
vincing clarity" demanded by the constitutional standard, that the New York
Times Publishing Company had-published the advertisement with knowledge
of its falsity, or with reckless disregard. 114 (On the facts, a finding of reckless
disregard was clearly open to the Court. The New York Times Publishing
Company had the resources within its own files to check the accuracy of the
copy against its own news stories. Thus, there is even some suggestion that a
publisher is immune if the publication clearly identifies the defamatory
material as representing, not its own views, but the views of a responsible
organization.)
To make its holding doubly secure, the Court further ruled that the
evidence was inadequate to identify the plaintiff with the assertions in the
advertisement.
The importance of this "constitutional malice" test cannot be stressed
enough. It recalls the earlier discussion about whether a concept of freedom of
speech extends to protect the right to differ about what is the truth, and
whether falsehood is not also comprehended. In a deep sense, the New York
Times decision is about the relevance of truth to constitutional protection.115
The Court laid down two rationales in support of its tolerance for good
faith error. The first is that some "erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and.., must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.' "116 The second is that an in-
tolerance for a permissible margin of error tends to generate a kind of prior
"self-censorship." The man who is compelled "to guarantee the truth of all
his factual assertions, or to bear the burden of defending their truth," is likely
to "steer much wider of the unlawful zone" than is necessary, with the result
1 "2 Kalven, supra note 10, at 203.
113 New York Times, supra note 11, at 279-80.
114Id. at 285-86.
115 Kalven, supra note 10 at 210-13.
116 Supra note 11, at 271-72.
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that not only unlawful speech is deterred. 117 Thus, the special vice of a regime
of strict liability is that it leads to an antecedent restraint - a self-censorship
which impacts upon even lawful speech. The signal importance of the New
York Times rule is that it creates a qualified privilege for a margin of error and
for the good faith critics of public officials, which is defeasible only upon
proof of actual malice.
Thus, the rule in New York Times selected a constitutional posture at a
point on the spectrum between absolute liability for defamation and absolute
privilege for freedom of speech. By shifting the burden of proof to the plain-
tiff to satisfy the court of the defendant's actual malice against a standard of
"convincing clarity," the New York Times test sought to adjust the balance
between two conflicting interests, and came out in favour of freedom of
speech. That shift of burden is, endorsed by section 1 of the Charter.
The question of onus under the Charter is not free from difficulty. But the
cases that are beginning to reach us would seem to support this view."18 The
high court decision in the Rauca litigation suggested that the "limits" to be ap-
plied require the court to adopt an objective standard, and that "the
demonstrable justification which modifies the reasonable limits be interpreted
in a manner that leans slightly in favour of the individual when the competing
rights of the individual and of society are being balanced in the courts." 11 9
I would argue that the kind of balancing contemplated by section 1 of the
Charter invites the two-tiered analysis of Mr. Justice Brennan in New York
Times, with a low threshold test on the substantive question posed by section
2(b), (whether the particular rule of liability offends freedom of expression);
and a balancing test under section 1, which at a minimum, places the burden
on the plaintiff to demonstrate the constitutional justification for the current
rule of liability.
B. The Private Plaintiff
The issue left open by New York Times until its resolution in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., was the proper test of liability in cases brought by private
plaintiffs. 120
The events that culminated in the Gertz libel action began with a much
publicized killing of a Chicago youth by a policeman. The boy's family retain-
ed Elmer Gertz, a prominent Chicago civil liberties lawyer, to bring a civil ac-
tion against the policeman who was subsequently convicted of second degree
murder. An article then appeared in a magazine alleging that the policeman's
117 Id. at 279.
11
8 Quebec Association of Protestant SchoolBoards et al. v. Quebec (No. 2) (1982),
140 D.L.R. 33 at 57-59 (Que. S.C.). Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society v.
Ontario Board of Censors, supra note 36, at 9-10; Rauca v. Federal Republic of Ger-
many, supra note 11, at 241: "[T]he wording of s. 1 makes it clear that he who seeks to
support the limit prescribed by law has the burden of establishing on the balance of
probabilities that it is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable"; the burden on the pro-
ponents of the limiting legislation is described in Rauca as "significant." Id. at 246.
"
9 Federal Republic of Germany v. Rauca (1982), 38 O.R. (2d) 705 at 715 (H.C.),
aff'd41 O.R. (2d) 225.
120 Gertz, supra note 103.
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murder trial was a "frame-up," and that Gertz was part of a communist con-
spiracy to discredit the local police. Elmer Gertz filed a libel action in Federal
Court. After the jury returned a verdict in his favour, a district court judge
subsequently decided that the standard enunciated in New York Times was
applicable, and entered a judgment for the defendant magazine. Notwithstan-
ding the falsity of most of the statements in the article, Elmer Gertz had been
unable to prove actual malice. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,121 which had expanded the New York Times
test to protect "all discussion and communication including matters of public
or general concern."'122 But when the case came to the Supreme Court, the
Court retrenched, rejecting the application of the New York Times test to ac-
tions involving private plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with common ground: "Under the
First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea." 123 Returning to the
approach in Chaplinsky'24 it reasserted: "But there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact." 125 Although erroneous statements of fact are not
worthy of constitutional protection, they are nonetheless inevitable in free
debate. The Court affirmed New York Times as regards public debate on
public figures, citing James Madison for the proposition: "Some degree of
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing." 1
26
Then the Court qualified the rule enunciated in New York Times. A rule
which seeks to avoid self-censorship by the news media loses its social value
when the private plaintiff is involved. At this point, the state interest in com-
pensating injury to reputation holds sway over the constitutional interest:
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of in-
dividuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. We would not
lightly require the State to abandon this purpose, for,... the individual's right to
the protection of his own good name "reflects no more than our basic concept of
the essential dignity and worth of every human being - a concept at the root of
any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like
the protection of life itself is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments." 1 27 [Citations ommited.]
The Court gave a number of reasons for drawing this distinction. When it
comes to the public figure, a notion almost of voluntary assumption of risk is
involved. Public persons, after all, are distinguished "by reason of the notorie-
ty of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the
public's attention."' 128 Individuals seeking public office must accept certain
necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs, one of which is
the greater degree of public scrutiny. 1
29
121403 U.S. 29 (1971).
12Id. at44.
"2 Gertz, supra note 103, at 339.
1
24 Supra note 50.
125 Gertz, supra note 103, at 340.
126 Id.
127Id. at 341.
128 Id. at 342.
129Id. at 344.
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Secondly, there is the question of remedy: The first remedy of any victim
of defamation is self-help. There are more available opportunities for the
public person to contradict the lie or to immunize its impact on reputation.
Public figures, "enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication" and hence have a more realistic opportunity to contradict the
falsehood. 130 The same cannot be said of the private individual. Because
private persons are more vulnerable to injury, they are more deserving of the
State's protection. For these reasons, the Court must fashion a different rule.
That rule may be summarized thus: The States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher of defamatory falsehood in-
jurious to a private individual "so long as they do not impose liability without
fault." 131
Finally, damage awards are another way of preserving the constitutional
balance. These must extend no further than what is necessary to protect the
legitimate interests involved. That means no compensation for anything other
than actual injury. No punitive or presumed damages may be recovered
against a publisher unless there is a showing of knowledge or reckless disregard
of the falsity of the defamatory publication. 132
There are several problems implicit in the Gertz holdings. The first is the
difficulty of drawing the public/private line, as demonstrated by the facts
themselves. Elmer Gertz was not found to be a public figure, even though he
had voluntarily become counsel in a case which was bound to involve him in
notoriety. The second is that the broad stricture that States may not impose
liability without fault, leaves definition of "fault" to each State. That may be
objectionable in view of the principle that a constitutional standard should be
of widespread and more certain application. 133
But for the writer of fiction who happens to choose private persons as his
models, Gertz poses a special threat - it withdraws any possibility of the New
York Times constitutional protection.
Libel law is a law of accretion. Now added to the common law and to
statute 134 is the possibility of constitutional adjudication. It has been necessary
to examine New York Times and Gertz to introduce the Canadian reader to the
potential impact of a constitutional argument on the traditional libel case. But
whatever the implication of those cases for political expression, their principles
have proven singularly inappropriate when applied to literary works of fiction.
I turn now to the application of the New York Times standard where the
publication in question is a "calculated falsehood." 135
13OId.
31 Id. at 347.
132 Id. at 349.
133 Tribe, supra note 53, at 1049.
134An action for defamation can involve causes of action and defences under
statute and at common law. For example s. 3(6) of the Ontario Libel and Slander Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 237 reads: "Nothing in this section limits or abridges any privilege now
by law existing. .. "
135 Chaplinsky, supra note 50.
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VII. CALCULATED FALSEHOOD IN FICTION - A NONSENSE
ANALYSIS
Bindrim v. Mitchell1 36 saw the first American effort to apply the constitu-
tional law of libel to fiction.
In 1977, Gwen Davis Mitchell wrote Touching, a novel which described
the experiences of two women at a nude encounter group in California. The
author had actually attended such an encounter group some months before
writing her novel. When the novel was published, Dr. Paul Bindrim, the
operator of the encounter group, sued Mitchell and her publisher, Doubleday,
for libel, claiming the book both identified and defamed him. Bindrim admit-
ted he was a "public figure"' 137 which meant that under the New York Times
standard he must produce "clear and convincing evidence" that the publisher
and author had acted with knowledge that the statements were false or with
reckless disregard for whether they were false or not.
It took one footnote for the California Court of Appeal to dispose of the
book's classification as fiction: "The fact that "Touching" was a novel does
not necessarily insulate Mitchell from liability for libel, if all the elements of
libel are otherwise present." 38 That a work may be fiction is, in other words,
no defence. Assuming that the depiction was defamatory, the question then
became one of "actual malice." Since Mitchell was in the best position to
know the truth or falisty of her own material, in departing from that truth she
wrote the novel with actual malice. Her reckless disregard for the truth was ap-
parent from her knowledge of what had occurred at the actual encounter. 139
Doubleday might be excused prior to the hardback publication for relying
on the author's repeated assurances that the novel bore no resemblance to
reality. However, prior to the paperback printing, there was evidence in the
form of a letter from Bindrim to suggest there might be some inaccuracy. At
that point Doubleday was under a duty to investigate. Actual malice was thus
established against the publisher, too. 140
The Court then turned to the issue of identification. The fictional
character in Touching was described as a "fat Santa Clause type with long
white hair, white sideburns, a cherubic rosy face and rosy forearms"; the real-
life plaintiff was clean shaven and had short hair. 141 Notwithstanding these
physical dissimilarities, the Court found sufficient identification. It relied on
tape recordings of actual marathon sessions which showed a parallel between
the novel and the real life events. 142 In an alarmingly narrow statement of the
test, the Court concluded that it could not say, "that no one who knew plain-
tiff Bindrim could reasonably identify him with the fictional character." 1
43
136 Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
137Id. at35 n. 1.
138 Id. at 35 n. 2.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 36.
1411d. at 37.
142 Id.
143 Id. See also 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39: "The test is whether a reasonable person,
reading the book would understand that the fictional character therein pictured was, in
actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described."
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That low threshold surmounted, the only question left was whether the
statements in Touching were libelous. All that was needed was for the publica-
tion to "contain a false statement of fact."144 Predictably, the Court had no
trouble in making that finding. The portrayal of the plaintiff had cast him in a
disparaging light, depicting his language and conduct as "crude, aggressive
and unprofessional." 
145
Perhaps the best comment upon the spurious logic of the majority is made
in the dissent. Of course the book is false, reasons Mr. Justice Files. Of course
it "applies to the plaintiff," insofar as any book about encounter therapy
could be said to apply. 146 To infer malice because the fiction is false is an
absurdity:
From an analytical standpoint, the chief vice of the majority opinion is that it
brands a novel as libelous because it is "false," i.e. fiction; and infers "actual
malice" from the fact that the author and publisher knew it was not a true
representation of plaintiff. From a constitutional standpoint the vice is the chilling
effect upon the publisher of any novel critical of any occupational practice, in-
viting litigation on the theory "when you criticize my occupation, you libel
me." 147
The point is, of course, that fiction is libelous by its very nature. To say
that Gwen Mitchell was in a position to know the truth or falsity of her fiction
is to speak nonsense. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jefferson gives
itself away when it suggests that had the defendant author limited her novel,
"to a truthful or fictional description,"'148 the majority would have held dif-
ferently. What is that "truthful or fictional" really suggesting? It is suggesting
that the fiction must be either journalism, or journalism's opposite. To say,
"we will permit journalism, and we will permit pure fiction, but we will permit
nothing in between," is to make a legal prescription about what fiction is.
Should any court be competent to pass judgment on what constitutes lawful
literature? 149
144 Id. at 38.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 44.
147 Id. at 45.
148 Id. at 41.
149 The possible legal ramifications of the Bindrim decision are disturbing. Even
courts which have recognized the difficulty of evaluating a work not intended to be
truthful have looked upon Bindrim as "instructive." See, for example, Miss America
Pageant v. Penthouse International, 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981) at 1284 and 1286:
It would seem too simplistic in the case of a fictional or satirical work simply to
question whether the author/publisher had the subjective intent to publish a falsi-
ty, since such works are not intended to convey truth .... Since Bindrim is the only
decision in which a court applies the clear and convincing proof of actual malice re-
quirement to a work of fiction, it is the only bench mark for this court.
The Pring case arose when Penthouse published a satirical story about a Miss Wyom-
ing in the Miss America Pageant who was able to levitate those upon whom she per-
formed fellatio. The organizer's lawsuit against the defendant publisher was ultimately
dismissed as the Miss America Pageant was unable to put forward enough evidence
upon which a jury could find the magazine had acted with actual malice, as defined by
the constitutional New York Times standard. But a close reading of the case reveals how
faithfully the court followed the reasoning of Bindrim. The defendant magazine was
not actuated by actual malice, as it was not in a position to know the truth. It had not,
for example, attended a pageant nor received a letter from the Pageant prior to publica-
tion. (Id. at 1284) For a discussion of the Pring litigation, see Franklin and Trager,
supra note 14, at 231-32.
[VOL. 21, No. 4
Libel Law, Fiction and the Charter
The common ground between Bindrim v. Mitchell and the motion before
Master Sandier in Bennett v. Gage Educational Publishing Ltd. 150 is the at-
titude. The statement, "There is no such protection for novelists," is no dif-
ferent from saying: "The position of the-majority is simply to refuse to permit
a writer and publisher to libel a person and hide under the banner of having
written only fictional material." 1
51
Ironically, it is at the level of language that the lawmakers betray
themselves. There are the handful of judgments that speak sensitively of "the
acorn of fact" which becomes the "progenitor of the oak." 152 These under-
stand that authors, "of necessity must rely on their own background and ex-
periences in writing fiction." 153 In contrast, there are the judgments that speak
of "the varnish of fiction," and the "veiled attacks" that lurk behind this
"dastardly mode" of striking at reputations. 1
54
To understand the peculiar vulnerability of fiction to judicial handling of
legal liability is to understand something, not only of literature's sources, but
also of its ends.
The source is mimesis, the human instinct of "imitation", which Aristotle
tells us is "congenital to human beings from childhood" - fundamental to
man's nature. 155 Man "differs from the other animals in that he is the most im-
itative and learns his first lessons through imitation.' 156 The pleasure that all
men take in works of imitation is proof of what happens in the experience -
"recognition" (anagn~risis), the "shift from ignorance to awareness." 157
The purpose of playing, Hamlet tells the actors, is to hold the mirror up to
nature, to show virtue her own feature and scorn her own image. The reader of
fiction looks into the mirror and sees, not the writer, but himself, and perhaps
a reflection of the world in which he lives. What if he does not like the reflec-
tion? In a litigious age such as ours, it is not difficult to predict the reader's
response to recognition. The question is, whether the individual's response
should be society's.
To gain some appreciation of just how difficult that question is to answer,
the legal issue will be traced through some of its actual manifestations, by
focusing on the "of and concerning" requirement.
VIII. SALIENT FEATURES OF A LIBEL ACTION CONCERNING
FICTION
A. Identification
In order to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must prove that the
words complained of were written "of him"; that the language was
150 Supra note 1.
151Bindrinz, supra note 136, at 42.
152 People v. Scribner's Sons, 205 Misc. 818 at 821 (Magis. Ct. Kings Co. 1954).
153 Middlebrooksv. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F. 2d 141 at 143 (4th Cir. 1969).
154 Supra note 8, at 262, 264 (N.E.).
155 Aristotle, Poetics, reference made to translation by Gerald F. Else (University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Paperbacks: 1970) at 20.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 35-6.
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defamatory of him; and that there has been a publication - that is, a com-
munication of the words complained of to some person other than the plain-
tiff. 158
In an action for libel involving fiction, the point upon which liability turns
is the "of and concerning" requirement. 5 9 The test of identification is
whether reasonable people would suppose the fiction to mean an actual per-
son. If those who "know of the existence of the plaintiff would think that it
was the plaintiff - then the action is maintainable." 160
Unless a character is a "mere type" the portrayal will inevitably combine
both good and bad characteristics in order to satisfy the artistic ends of
verisimilitude. And it is almost inevitable that the bad characteristics will
satisfy the low threshold which a statement must pass in order to be
defamatory. Hence, the only real hurdle to the plaintiff is to prove the identity
requirement. Once that has been achieved, liability follows almost as a matter
of course.
Commentators have tended to organize cases which revolve around the
"of and concerning" issue into two categories: the "same name" cases; and
those in which, although the name is different, the plaintiff claims sufficient
external similarities to justify the identification. 161 The dichotomy is more one
of convenience than it is suggestive of a rule. Determinations in any one case
have tended to depend on the court and which factors it finds decisive amid a
range of variables. Nonetheless, in this ad hoc area of the law, some organiza-
tion is better than none.
158 Duncan and Neill, supra note 14, paras. 5.01, 6.01, 7.01, 8.01; Linden, supra
note 34, at 676, 683, 691.
159 In Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd. (1934), 50 T.L.R. 581
(C.A.), the defendants produced a film called Rasputin, the Mad Monk, depicting the
influence Rasputin had on the Czar and Czarina of Russia. The plaintiff, Princess Irina
Alexandrova of Russia, brought an action alleging that she would be understood to be
the Princess Natasha of-the movie whom Rasputin had either ravished or seduced. To
say that a woman has been ravished is unquestionably defamatory of her, "as tending
to cause her to be shunned and avoided although it involves no moral turpitude on her
part." Id. at 581. There was also no dispute as to publication. Hence, the case turned on
the question of identification. In the opinion of Scrutton L.J., while a depiction of an
imaginary person, a "mere type," would not be libelous, the defendant here would lose
if "there was evidence on which the jury could reasonably find that a considerable
number of reasonable people who saw the film would identify the Princess of the film
with the Princess Irena of Russia." Id. at 584. Although some of the incidents were fic-
tionalized, the damning "fact" which connected the fictional princess with the real was
that Prince Youssoupoff had killed Rasputin. Hence, the requirement that there be suf-
ficient evidence for reasonable people to take the libel complained of as relating to the
plaintiff was amply satisfied.
16°Hulton and Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20. This much criticized case may be as
much an aberration as it is a classic. In it, the House of Lords permitted one Artemus
Jones to sue a publisher who had coincidentally used that name in a fictional work. The
Hulton standard turned not on the author's intent, but on the public's reasonable
understanding.
See also Youssoupoff, supra note 159, at 583:
[W]e follow the law that though the person who writes and publishes the libel may
not intend to libel a particular person and, indeed, has never heard of that par-
ticular person, the plaintiff, yet, if evidence is produced that reasonable people
knowing some of the circumstances, not necessarily all, would take the libel com-
plained of to relate to the plaintiff an action for libel will lie.
161 Franklin and Trager, supra note 16, at 210-212; Silver, supra note 17, at
1077-1084.
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B. Same Name Cases
In Kelly v. Loew's'62 the plaintiff, Robert Kelly, was clearly identified as
the fictional character, Rusty Ryan, in the movie They Were Expendable. The
movie was based on a book in which Kelly's real name was used. The judgment
reads like a public relations exercise for the United States navy. Although the
film and the script depicted Ryan as a, "gallant officer, zealous to serve the
nation, respectful of his superiors, companionable with his equals, considerate
of his men, responsive - but not too responsive - to the charms of women,"
and imbued him with all the striking virtues of his race, "kindliness, generosi-
ty, humour, love of his fellow men, impetuous eagerness for action, ex-
uberance of spirit,"' 163 its creators made the mistake of rounding out the
characterization. The portrayal contained a few flaws - a certain im-
petuousness and lack of discipline, which the Massachussetts District Court
felt would injure the plaintiff's reputation in the professional class of naval of-
ficers. In finding liability, the Court dismissed the "disingenuous legend" that
the persons and events shown in the picture were fictitious. The legend, it said,
"would not have been treated by the average person or naval officer as any
more than a tongue-in-the-cheek disclaimer .... , 164
In contrast, is People v. Scribner's Sons,165 dismissing a complaint for
violation of the right to privacy lodged by Joseph Maggio, the alleged model
for the character of Angelo Maggio in a book entitled From Here to Eternity.
Joseph Maggio had served with the author in a regiment of the United States
Army, stationed in the same place and during the time-frame described in the
book. Except for the identity of name, none of the things the character
"Angelo Maggio" did in the book in any way resembled the real Maggio or his
life. The book also bore the standard disclaimer that it was a work of fiction,
that its characters were imaginary, and any resemblance to actual persons was
purely coincidental.
In ruling in the defendant's favour, the court took judicial notice of the
complex process of artistic creation - one which, of necessity, draws upon
the author's own background:
It is generally understood that novels are written out of the background and ex-
periences of the novelist. The characters portrayed are fictional, but very often
they grow out of real persons that author has met or observed. This is so also with
respect to the places which are the setting of the novel. The end result may be so
fictional as to seem wholly imaginary, but the acorn of fact is usually the pro-
genitor of the oak, which when full grown no longer has any resemblance to the
acorn.... Thus, the public has come to accept novels as pure fiction and does not
attribute their characters to real life. 166
The Court went on to say that so long as the author does not use the true name
of the character, there is no basis for complaint. Where a name is used, the
name, "like a portrait or picture, must upon meeting the eye or ear, be une-
qiiivocally identified as that of the complainant." 167 That test of "unequivocal
identification" might be viewed as limited to its context - a civil rights law
which was penal in nature - but it is also a recognition of the peculiar
162 Kelly v. Loew's, 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
163 Id. at 481.
164 Id. at 485.
165 Supra note 152.
166 Id. at 821.
167Id. at 823.
1983]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
vulnerability of fiction. As long as fiction is written, there will be persons who
are quick to associate fictional characters with themselves. Without this strin-
gent test of identification, "the writing of fiction would always be susceptible
to the hidden and virtually unavoidable peril of making authors and publishers
criminal perpetrators." 16
8
In Geisler v. Petrocelli, 169 we find another example of the use of a name,
"having no public recognition." The novel was written several months after
the plaintiff, Melanie Geisler, and defendant author had worked together in a
small publishing company for about six months. Along with the use of her
exact name, the author, Petrocelli, drew upon many of Ms. Geisler's physical
characteristics. Petrocelli's "potboiler" concerned the odyssey of a female
transsexual athlete through the allegedly corrupt and corrupting world of
women's professional tennis circuit. The book proclaimed itself to be a work
of fiction, again bearing the traditional disclaimer. A district court judge had
found that no reasonable reader could mistake Ms. Geisler for her fictional
namesake, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The test of identification it
adopted was whether the "libel designates the plaintiff in such a way as to let
those who knew her understand that she was the person meant. It is not
necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it is sufficient if those
who knew the plaintiff can make out that she is the person meant." 170 The
defendants tried to argue that the book was self-proclaimed fiction, that any
coincidence of name and commonality of physical traits were superficial, that
the facts were insufficient to establish behavioral identity. 171 But the Court of
Appeals thought these arguments pointed up a "disturbing irony": "The more
deserving the plaintiff of recompense for the tarnishing of a spotless reputa-
tion, the less likely will be any actual recovery." 172
Perhaps in Geisler the damning factor was the identical name. For at least
one other court has held that any reasonable reader would more likely con-
clude that an author deliberately created a character in an ugly way "so that
none would identify her." 73 Courts can obviously differ about the results of
the identification requirement. On the facts in Geisler it would seem that office
workers who knew Ms. Geisler were just as likely to realize she was not the
transsexual tournament tennis player described in the book.
C. Similar Name Cases
There is a middle range of cases which might be termed the "similar
name" cases.
168 Id.




173 Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 300 F. 2d 372 at 376 (7th Cir. 1962).
Anatomy of a Murder was a study through fiction of an actual murder trial. The fic-
tional locale was fairly identifiable with the actual. The writer had been defence at-
torney at the actual trial, and those how knew him would identify him with his fictional
counterpart, just as those who knew the real Hazel Wheeler could reasonably identify
her with the fictional Janice Quill by certain physical and contextual similarities. But the
court rationalized that the negative aspects of the behavioural depiction negatived the"of and concerning requirement." Another factor was the minor importance of the role
in the overall work.
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In Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Company174 an action was brought
by one boyhood friend against another for a short-story published in the
Saturday Evening Post, listed in the magazine's index under fiction. The story
featured two teenagers, Esco Brooks and Earl Edge, whose desperate concern
was the upkeep of their car. In realizing this objective, the boys committed a
number of thefts. The author of the story, William Price Fox, and the plain-
tiff, Larry Esco Middlebrooks, had grown up together in Columbia. They
were close friends as boys and continued to correspond and to see each other
after both left Columbia. After the story was published, Middlebrooks
brought a suit against the author, alleging damage to his reputation. The test,
again, was whether the fictional character could reasonably be understood as a
portrayal of the plaintiff.'17
The court clearly could have gone either way. It started with the premise
that "Moonshine Light, Moonshine Bright" was an obvious work of
fiction.' 76 It was labeled as such and was illustrated. Among the marked
dissimilarities between the fictionai character and the plaintiff were the dif-
ferences in ages, the absence of the real plaintiff from Columbia at the time of
the fictional episode, and the differences in employment. 177 The use of actual
place names and geographical settings did not militate against the common
understanding of fiction as fiction only: "Authors of necessity must rely on
their own background and experiences in writing fiction." 178 The Court held
that under these circumstances "Esco Brooks" was not reasonably to be
understood as a portrayal of the plaintiff, Larry Esco Middlebrooks.
Another case which falls into the similar name category is Corrigan v.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 179 The novel depicted, somewhat realistically, the adven-
tures of one Arnold L'Hommedieu in New York's underworld. A chapter
headed "Justice - a la Cornigan" brought the hero into a court over which
the plaintiff Corrigan frequently presided as magistrate, and dealt in a
scathing way with the way the fictional Cornigan dispensed with justice. To
make matters worse, the writer had once appeared before the real-life
magistrate as a defendant on a criminal charge. The Court found the inference
unmistakable that the author intended "deliberately and with personal malice
to vilify plaintiff, under the barely fictitious name of Cornigan." 180 It further
held that this intent to injure was chargeable to the publisher, the actual
defendant in the case. 181 The publisher's lack of intent to injure was irrelevant,
as intent is presumed from the publication itself. These, then, were the facts
that gave raise to the oft-cited words: "The question is not so much who was
aimed at as who was hit," 182 and the words cited by the Court in Bindrim183 to
justify its holding: "Reputations may not be traduced with impunity, whether
under the literary forms of a work of fiction, or in jest." 1
84
174 Supra note 153.




179 Supra note 8.
180Id. at 262 (N.E.).
181 Id. at 263 (N.E.).
182Id. at 262 (N.E.).
1
83 Bindrim, supra note 136, at 42.
184 Corrigan, supra note 8, at 262 (N.E.).
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D. Different Names
We have already seen that in Bindrim, the court adopted an extremely
liberal test for the identification requirement - whether anyone who knew
Bindrim could reasonably identify him with the fictional character. The test
was met despite the fact that the names, professions and physical descriptions
were dissimilar, and despite the fact that the book was clearly labeled as a
work of fiction.l8 5
A disturbing case for its emotional overtones is Fetler v. Houghton Mif-
flin Co., 186 where one brother claimed to have been libeled by another.
Whatever the biblical proportions of the litigation, (all the members of a large
family became involved), 8 7 it was dealt with solely on the narrow issue of
identification.
The novel was the author's first, and both he and his publisher regarded it
as a serious work of creative fiction. 8 8 The plaintiff offered the following
similarities between the novel and fact:189 The novel depicted events in the life
of the Solovyov family, a large family composed of a father, mother and thir-
teen children - the exact composition of the Fetler family. In the novel, Max-
im is the eldest child and is the age the true plaintiff would have been at the
time of the book's events. In the novel, the father is an itinerant Russian Pro-
testant minister whose wife and children perform as a band and choir wherever
the father preaches. Maxim, the fictional son, is generally responsible for their
temporal needs. The fictional family travels about Europe in an old bus, just
as had the actual family. When the plaintiff asked his brother what he was
writing about, the brother said he was writing "about our father, the family
concerts and me." 190
According to the plaintiff, the novel was libelous because it showed Max-
im as co-operating with a Nazi organization for easy money and, in frantic
pursuit of money, abandoning his father on his death bed.191 The defendant
vigorously disputed the libel, asserting that Maxim was a "sympathetic
character. "192
185 See text accompanying notes 138-47, supra.
186 Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F. 2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966).
187 Id. at 654.
18 Id. at 650.
'89Id. at 651.
190Id.
191 Id. at 650.
192Id. at 650. One can only imagine the eldest brother's reaction to being told his
fictional counterpart was a "sympathetic character." In a short-story about Emile
Zola's comparable "betrayal" of his friend Paul Cezanne through the writing of a
book, author Rolaine Hochstein uses fiction to imagine Cezanne's response. The
passage is of interest in that it dramatizes the compelling interests involved:
"He knew who it was about, all right. After he read the book, glowering at page
after page with his closely set, farseeing eyes, hurt and anger wringing down into
his belly until he couldn't sit straight; after he thought it was bad enough doing
what he had to do and always wondering if it was really junk as so many people
said it was but doing it anyway because that was what he saw; after thinking on
high days he had a masterpiece going and thinking on low days he ought to do
something constructive like take up house painting, knowing it's only one life and
he's spending it as a failure; after forgetting rejection, forgetting Paris, the exposi-
tions, Zola with his ease and his acclaim and his women (it was hard to forget the
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The sole question before the Court of Appeals was "whether those who
knew him [understood] that he was the person meant." 193 There can be little
dispute with the Court's holding on these facts. Notwithstanding the usual
disclaimer, the Court held that the summary judgment on the issue of iden-
tification was improper on this record, and that there was sufficient evidence
to go to the trier of fact. 194
While the narrow holding as to identification is persuasive, it is none-
theless problematic that such a finding of identification could automatically
lead to liability on Fetler-type facts. Does a Fetler eldest brother bring an ac-
tion because he is concerned to make the writer tell more truth, or to keep him
from revealing the truth? That the artistic portrait of the brother may indeed
have been "sympathetic" is at least indicative of the writer's intent. The
brother's hurt is no indication that the writer had intended to vilify. There is
something deeply worrisome about a law which, in taking no account of the
writer's motivation, in forcing writers to stick to the purely "truthful or fic-
tional," could take away from the writer one of his most passionate and com-
pelling sources: the family experience. While one can sympathize with the
eldest brother's position, something more important may be at stake: the
writer's compelling need to give voice to his family's untold story, and perhaps
to transcend the experience in the process; to make art of the personal for the
benefit of us all.
As the above cases reveal, sufficiency of identification is determined on a
case-by-case basis. Although in Fetler, the Court declared itself "not unaware
of the emotional overtones" 195 in a case where a man claims his brother has
libeled him, by and large the identification issue is not determined with a view
to its ramifications.
Moreover, application of the New York Times constitutional criteria once
the issue of identification has been overcome means that any novel traceable to
reality automatically fails the test of "knowing falsity." As one commentator
has suggested, the American state-of-the-art regarding fiction means that First
Amendment protection for fiction is substantially weaker than protection for
news or non fiction. 196 Some commentators have even gone so far as to suggest
that "the prudent author must balance artistic license against potential liability
for libel or invasion of privacy." 197 One can only speculate about the resultant
work-product of a nation of "prudent authors."
The malice rule of New York Times, fashioned to allow good faith error
for allegedly defamatory criticism of public officials by the media, does not
work when applied to fiction. To phrase the inquiry in terms of "did the
women) now to find himself used, reduced to words - facts of his life, small and
secret experiences, his doubts, his torment, all used. Paul Cezanne was not a man
to howl. The shape of his friend's treachery filled his mind. He never spoke to Zola
again."
Hochstein, "Emile Zola and His Friend Paul Cezanne," Atlantic Monthly, (Dec. 1975),
84 at 85.
1
93 Supra note 186, at 651.
194Id. at 652.
195 Id.
196 Kulzick and Hogue, Chilled Bird: Freedom of Expression in the Eighties (1980),
14 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 57 at 70.
197 Yayashi and Littlefield, Supra note 15 at 1047.
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author know he was falsifying?" ignores the essential differences between fic-
tion and reportage. Similarly, the plaintiff who is a private figure will likewise
prevail if the test that is adopted is the proof-of-fault test proposed by
Gertz,198 which leaves definition of fault to each state. If negligence will
satisfy, then all that a plaintiff need prove is that the defendant wrote his novel
in negligent disregard for whether it defamed an actual person - quite apart
from whether injury was intended. Such an inquiry requires the writer to
second-guess his readers, and the point at which the source of his inspiration
has been sufficiently disguised. It can only inhibit creativity. Moreover, if the
New York Times test has proved insufficient to protect writers of fiction, any
test less stringent will likewise fail.
Furthermore, the public/private dichotomy grew out of cases all involv-
ing the news media. The resultant tests were based on considerations peculiar
to the news media, such as the extent to which the public figure could im-
munize any harm by exercising his own ability to reply. It is not logical to sug-
gest that anyone - whether public or private - can answer an allegedly
defamatory fiction by writing a fiction of his own. This is not to say, however,
that fiction is thereby less deserving of constitutional protection. It is rather to
suggest that fiction requires its own test - one which need not necessarily de-
pend on the author's choice of a protagonist.
IX. TOWARD A RESTATEMENT OF THE RULE
At one extreme, it does not seem right that a mere labelling of a work as
fiction should grant absolute immunity for the most vindictive attacks - just
as we would not want a mere label as libel law to grant "talismanic immunity"
from constitutional scrutiny. At the other extreme, a rule which does not
recognize the special nature of the form and the social cost in prescribing areas
of permissible subject-matter is untenable.
The New York Times standard reflected the United States Supreme
Court's recognition that some error is inevitable in free debate and must be
protected if freedom of expression is to have the breathing space it needs to
survive. It also reflected a recognition that in many areas "truth" is not a
readily identifiable concept, and that putting "truth" to the pre-existing prej-
udices of a jury might effectively institute a system of self-censorship. 199 The
New York Times standard left open an avenue of recourse to the courts for the
aggrieved plaintiff where the publication was made with knowing falsity or
reckless disregard.
In defamation cases, the concern is with defamatory lies masquerading as
truth. With fiction, the concern is entirely different: "All fiction, by defini-
tion, eschews an obligation to be faithful to historical truth. Every fiction
writer knows his creation is in some sense 'false'. That is the nature of the art.
Therefore ... it is meaningless to charge that the author 'knew' his work was
false." 2°° Recognizing this absurdity, the court in Leopold v. Levin explicitly
198 Gertz, supra note 103.
199 Supra note 40, at 406 per Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting
in part (1967).
20 Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 at 359, 603 P.
2d 454 at 461 (Cal. 1979).
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held that, "substantially creative works of fiction" would not be subject to the
"knowing or reckless falsity" or actual malice standards. 
201
The difficulty is to fashion a rule which will not import the role of literary
critic into the function of judges. 2°2 In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v.
Twentieth Century Fox, 20 3 the Court expressly declined to state its views on the
artistic merit, good taste, or essential treatment accorded to the school by the
film and the book: "It is fundamental that courts may not muffle expression
by passing judgment on its skill or clumsiness, its sensitivity or coarseness; nor
on whether it pains or pleases." 204
The reason for such an approach is that there is something inherently
dangerous about a rule which says that creative imagination is only creative
when it transcends the personal; which, in effect, penalizes bad novelists for
the failure of their art. Fostering a creative ground in which great works of art
can take root means extending freedom of expression to minor novelists,
popular novelists and bad novelists along with the good.
That this liberty is often carried to excess; that it has sometimes degenerated into
licentiousness, is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not yet been discovered.
Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with which it is allied; perhaps it is a
shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk without wounding vitally the plant
from which it is torn.
205
At the same time, does it satisfy to say that because the rule is hard to for-
mulate, the freedom must be absolute? Does it suffice to let the writer's own
discretion be his tutor? On the facts of a case like Geisler v. Petrocelli, where
the writer took not only the physical characteristics of his model but also her
name, it is clear that this discretion cannot always be trusted. Even if the writer
needed the name to stimulate his imagination through the private stages of
creation, the substitution of almost any name in the final manuscript would
have been, if nothing else, an act of courtesy. A rule which delegates discretion
to the writer, trusts the writer, in effect, to define the freedom of another -
the right of that other individual to shape the "self" he shows to the world. It
ignores that there may be irresponsible writers, just as there are irresponsible
journalists, doctors and lawyers. It believes that no writer could ever break
faith in circumstances where the private individual is powerless to respond.
There comes a point when freedom of expression as a defence is wholly
parasitic upon the deeper concerns of personhood. I would suggest the limit is
reached for fiction when words are used as the instruments of assault.
201 Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E. 2d 250 at 256 (1970). The Levin case involved
privacy rather than libel, but Professor Silver has suggested that "the thin line between
the two torts need not justify a radically different result." Supra note 17, at 1090.
202 As part of the test Professor Wilson has suggested she would have the court in-
quire "Is the work fiction?" - that is, is it fiction or "reportage thinly disguised?"
Supra note 15, at 44. It is submitted that this test is untenable since it involves the court
in an aesthetic judgement on a matter on which their opinion is of one more value than
anyone else's.
203 22 A.D. 2d 452, 256 N.Y.S. 2d 301 (1965), affd 15 NY 2d 940, 207 N.E. 2d 508
(1965).
204Id. at 307 (N.Y.S.).
20S Excerpt from Madison's Address, January 23, 1799, appendix to opinion of
Douglas J., concurring in Garrison, supra note 36, at 87.
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X. PROPOSED RULE
The test one might fashion would begin with the creation of a qualified
privilege for writers of fiction which places the burden on the plaintiff to prove
every element of his case. Identification would have to be unequivocal: It must
be unequivocal that the author intended to make a particular person the target
of attack. That is, the assault would have been ineffectual without the iden-
tification.
Furthermore, injury must result from the identification. Under this rule,
damages would not be presumed from the mere fact of publication. They
would have to be proven. 20 6
This privilege would furthermore be defeasible only on proof of "express
malice" in its popular sense of spite and ill will - the "desire to injure the
person who is defamed." 207 This test of malice will require the court to inquire
into the intent of the writer. Whereas now intent is irrelevant except where
defences of fair comment or privilege are claimed, in this suggested test intent
becomes pivotal to establishing liability. Intent to injure must have been the
primary purpose of the portrait. 20 8 In no case involving a writer of fiction
2°6When so fundamental a freedom is at stake, the issue of injury should not be
allowed to turn on hypothetical damage done to a man's name in the minds of the
"average reader." See, e.g., Murphy v. La Marsh, [1971] 2 W.W.R. 196 at 202, aff'g
(1970), 73 W.W.R. 114 (B.C.C.A.). For an important recent case on the assessment of
damages in libel actions, see also Munro v. The Toronto Sun (1982), 21 C.C.LT. 261 at
294 per Holland J.: "Damages in libel actions are 'at large' and rest upon a considera-
tion of the injury to the plaintiff, the conduct of the defendant and the plaintiff and, in
some cases, the deterrent effect sought to be accomplished.... Injury to reputation is
assumed when libel is proved."
20 Horrocksv. Lowe, [1975] A.C. 135 at 149, [1974] 1 All E.R. 662 at 669per Lord
Diplock.
208 Penetration of a writer's primary motive will, of course, be a complex task. An
analogy for my "primary purpose" test was suggested by s. 159(8) of the Criminal
Code, which deems obscene any publication "a dominant characteristic of which is the
undue exploitation of sex.... "
One can identify a number of factors which would guide the Court in determining
whether the "primary purpose" of the fiction was to injure a real plaintiff. The most
obvious is evidence as to the actual relationship between the writer and the plaintiff.
A second factor is artistic, social, or cultural merit. That there were purposes beyond
the alleged harm would tend to negative an intent to do damage as the primary purpose.
Jurisprudence, again, on the question of obscenity in relation to art takes into account
artistic merit as one factor in the determination: R. v. Cameron, [1966] 2 O.R. 777
(Ont. C.A.); R. v. Coles, [1965] 1 O.R., 557, 49 D.L.R. (2d) 34 (Ont. C.A.); Brodie,
Dansky and Rubin v. The Queen, [1962] S.C.R. 681.
The author's commitment to the genre is a third factor which might have some bear-
ing. Professional commitment would tend to negative intent to injure as a "primary
purpose." This factor must not be used to stifle first novels, whose authors will not be
able to point to prior accomplishment in support of their own credibility. Rather, it is
suggested in aid of writers who have made a significant contribution to the nation's
literature, and who should be able to call upon this contribution when faced with a
challenge. In the case of first novels, evidence as to the author's past relationship with
the real-life counterpart; expert evidence as to the book's merit, whether social or ar-
tistic; and the promise of the author, should be considered in an attempt to pierce
through to his motivation.
None of the above three factors should be conclusive in itself. Taken together, they
are meant as objective guides to assist a court in determining whether an author intend-
ed to produce a work of art or entertainment, or whether he has simply manipulated
words as the instruments of assault.
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would intent be presumed from the publication itself. This aspect of the rule
actually seeks to revive traditional notions of commutative justice - loss
distribution based on fault. If one of the deeper purposes of tort law is to per-
form commutative or corrective justice, then a rule of law which imposes
liability for expression independent of any notion of fault is inconsistent, not
only with the Charter, but also with a philosophical theory of tort itself.
Rather than "calculated falsehood" the above rule posits a test of inten-
tion, of "calculated harm."
As for the publisher, one could adopt the suggestion of Professor Wilson,
that "a variation of the New York Times test be applied to this situation: Did
the publisher publish the work with knowledge that the author intended to
defame the plaintiff or with reckless disregard of the defamatory intent?"2°9
Such a rule rejects the Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co. notion that intent to in-
jure is chargeable to the publisher. 210 Some support for distinguishing the
malice of the writer from the malice of the publisher already exists in the dis-
sent of Mr. Justice Dickson in Cherneskey.211 Criteria relevant to determining
whether a publisher published the comment with knowledge of the writer's in-
tent to injure will vary. If, for example, the publisher receives a letter inform-
ing him that a potential plaintiff believes he was the target of a scathing por-
trayal, the publisher is put on notice and may have some duty to conduct fur-
ther investigations before releasing a reprint or paperback edition.
212
The rationale for not imputing the writer's motive to the publisher is
similar to the rationale for moving away from a regime of strict liability: faced
with a high potential for liability and the estimated costs of defending a law
suit compared with projected profits, publishers would be reluctant to puslish
certain books, such as first novels, which normally rank low in mass appeal
and are generally considered suspect as tending to be autobiographical. Such a
policy would stifle creativity at its inception. 213 The result is that an important
avenue of expression is blocked and society's ability to apprehend itself
thereby diminished.
XI. APPLYING THE TEST
What might be the likely outcome of the Bennett suit when analyzed in
terms of the above test?
A. Unequivocal identification
As pleaded in the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim 214 and suggested by a
1980 Books in Canada article on the suit, 215 evidence of a commonality of
traits and incidents which might lead persons acquainted with Leslie James
Bennett to believe he was the fictional character "S" referred to in S, Portrait
209 Wilson, supra note 15, at 49.
210 See text accompanying notes 166-68, supra.
211 Cherneskey, supra note 21.
212 Bindrim, supra note 136, at 36.
213 Stam, supra note 15, at 90n. 67, 96n. 99.
214 Supra note 9, Amended Statement of Claim of Leslie James Bennett, para. 4.
215Neill, Suit andDagger, Books in Canada, Jan. 1980, at 3.
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of a Spy, was likely to have been extensive. A sample list might look as
follows:
(1) among the book's dedications are the initials L.J.B. - coincident-lly
the same initials of the Plaintiff;
(2) in the novel, "S" is an intelligence officer, and deputy director of
counter-espionage of the Security Services of the R.C.M.P.. Leslie James Ben-
nett also headed the S.S. counter-espionage of the R.C.M.P.; 216
(3) there are parallels between the circumstances of Bennett's departure
from the service and that of the fictional "S". In the book "S" is interrogated
by his R.C.M.P. superiors and allowed to resign from his job and to take an
early retirement. He settles in Australia. Bennett's R.C.M.P. career ended
abruptly in 1972 when the director-general of the S.S. informed him that his
loyalty was in question. He was interrogated for four days. Soon after the in-
terrogation, he had assembled the papers needed for a "medical discharge."
Bennett's search for a climate more suiting to his asthma took him briefly to
South Africa, then eventually to Australia. 217 The fictional "S" also suffers
from asthma;
(4) in the book, the character "S" is asked about a mysterious character
named Philby. The connection between Philby and "S" is a brief acquaint-
ance in Istanbul, just after the war. Like the fictional "S", Bennett met a
Philby in the late 1940s when they served together in Istanbul. 218
Based on the above sample of similarities, one would have trouble quar-
relling with a Court's finding that the evidence is sufficient to establish iden-
tification. But identification under the above test does not end the inquiry.
B. Injury
Ian Adams pleaded that Bennett had no reputation to injure, by reason of
his residence in Australia where the book was not published, and by reason of
the circumstances surrounding his retirement from the R.C.M.P. - cir-
cumstances which were a matter of public record. 219
I submit that this pleading should have been relevant to both liability and
to damages. Bennett left the force in 1972 apparently without prospects. 220 His
early retirement provided for a pension of $7,000 a year. 221 Bennett apparently
sent letters to friends in various countries, but no offers of employment
resulted. Gage published the Adams novel in 1977. By the time Bennett
brought suit, his' ill health had left him unable to work. His pension had grown
to $10,000, from which he not only supported an aged father and a woman ill
with leukemia, but also made child support payments to his wife. 222 The book
did not precipitate Bennett's early retirement. Nor did it precipitate the
R.C.M.P. investigations. Furthermore, whatever reputational damage it
216 1d.
2 17 1d. at5.
218Id. at4.
219 Supra note 9, at para. 11.
220 Neill, supra note 215, at 5.
22Id.
22 Id
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might have caused would have been virtually indistinguishable from the
damage already caused by the circumstances surrounding Bennett's retirement
from the R.C.M.P. On these facts, one cannot help but think that any damage
award would have been a windfall for Bennett.
C. Was Intent to Injure Leslie James Bennett the Primary Purpose of "S"?
Under the above test, the qualified privilege which is granted to writers of
fiction is defeasible only upon proof of actual malice - the desire to injure
the person defamed. Bennett would be required to prove that an intent to
cause him reputation damage was the primary purpose of the characterization.
It will be recalled that Ian Adams pleaded that "S" described a fictional
character against a background of public offices and institutions not the prop-
erty of any one person.
2 3
Had Adams been asked at trial about his intent, he might have said that
his purpose was no more than to write a spy novel: He wanted to explore, in as
convincing and textured a manner as possible, the psychological motivation of
a spy. To do so, he chose to set his story against the background of the Cana-
dian Secret Service, which, of necessity, would have its office in Ottawa, its
director of counter-espionage, and even, possibly, its double-agents. He might
have said that this fictional world was no more than an educated guess about
how secret services might operate. In creating it, he was drawing upon his own
reading in the genre, an accumulated knowledge culled from news stories, and
what he knew or surmised of political life and secret governmental machinery.
He had no intent to single out and defame the actual Leslie James Bennett.
These possible responses of Ian Adams to the question posed by the intent
test are, of course, pure speculation. But what are the factors a court might
take into account in assessing the credibility of that hypothetical reply?
As one discoverable factor, I have suggested evidence of the actual rela-
tionship between writer and plaintiff.224 Although Adams knew about the
plaintiff, he had never actually met or spoken to Leslie James Bennett. 225 This
would tend to indicate a lack of intent to injure.
Commitment to the genre may be another factor to weigh in assessing
whether Ian Adams intended to write a spy novel, or whether he intended to
injure the plaintiff while hiding behind the banner of fiction. Adams's writing
career included a distinguished period as a journalist at Maclean's
magazine. 226 After S, Portrait of a Spy, he went on to publish a second spy
novel, End Game In Paris. This would tend to indicate that his purpose was,
indeed, to write a spy novel.
Another factor might be the book's social, cultural or artistic importance.
The purpose of inquiring into social or artistic merit is to discover whether
other purposes predominate over the alleged injury. Other purposes tend to
negative that the author's intent was to harm. Ian Adams may have meant the
book as social criticism of the corruption that breeds whenever government
2 Supra note 9.
n4 Supra note 208.
m Neill, supra note 215, at 4.
226Id. at 3.
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agencies are "secret." Social value of the resultant work, as well as social cost
in proscribing it, may properly be considered in assessing the author's motiva-
tion. Just as the dissent in Bindrim envisoned one consequence of that decision
as inviting litigation on the theory that "when you criticize my occupation,
you libel me," 227 would a finding of intent to cause reputational damage make
it impossible for future writers of spy novels ever to publish fiction about the
Security Service?
Adams might also want to lead expert evidence as to artistic merit. As in-
timated earlier, conclusions about artistic merit should not be determinative
for purposes of the law, nor should it be determinative whether a work pains
or pleases a particular plaintiff. Rather, artistic merit may be one factor in
assessing whether one man's perceived offence should become society's.
The above are all factors the court might consider in its attempt to pierce
through the veil of fiction to determine the author's motivation. Using the
above test, I suggest that a court would not find that Ian Adams's purpose was
to use his art as the instrument of assault.
It is suggested that the constitutional guarantee requires a rule, such as the
one posited above, that would recognize that writers do and must of necessity
draw upon their own lives and the world which they inhabit. Mimdsis is the
very essence of art, as fundamental to the creative process as it is to man's
nature. At the same time, the constitutional guarantee for fiction would stop
short of an absolute immunity, in order to protect those who happen to inhabit
the writer's experience from wholesale attacks upon their reputations -
assaults which have no ostensible purpose beyond the harm.
XII. EXISTING BASIS FOR THE RULE: THE DEFENCE OF
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
Within the law of defamation as currently framed, "[t] here are occasions
upon which the courts have considered the publication of untrue defamatory
statements to be a necessary risk incidental to the pursuit of other social
policies .... "228 On these occasions, the law makes a conscious choice be-
tween expressive and reputational interests by deciding that it is better for the
common good that one individual should suffer than that freedom of expres-
sion should be abridged. 229
The principle of protection, as stated in Toogood v. Spyring230 may be
summarized thus: While the law presumes a publication to be malicious from
the fact that it is defamatory, there may be occasions where the communica-
tion is protected. If it is "fairly made by a person in the discharge of some
public orprivate duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own af-
fairs, in matters where his interest is concerned," then, depending on the
absence of actual malice, the law protects such communications "for the com-
227 Supra note 136, at 45.
m Weiler, supra note 7, at 282. See also Doody, Freedom of the Press, The Charter
of Rights, andaNew Category of Qualified Privilege (1983), 61 Can. Bar Rev. 124. Mr.
Doody's thesis is that application of the Charter may lead to an alteration of the law of
qualified privilege as a defence for the media in libel actions.
229 Bowen v. Hall (1881), 6 Q.B.D. at 343 per Lord Coleridge C.J.
230 Toogoodv. Spyring (1834), 1 C.M.&R. 181 at 193, 149 E.R. 1044 at 1050.
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mon convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the
right to make them within any narrow limits."231 [emphasis added]
While it is clear in principle that the occasions of qualified privilege, "can
never be catalogued and rendered exact,"23
2 the actual circumstances in which
the defence has succeeded have tended to be kept within a fairly narrow com-
pass 23 3 - for instance, fair and accurate reports of parliamentary or judicial
proceedings; 23 4 and defamatory statements made for the purpose of defending
one's own interest.
23 5
The classic definition of a privileged occasion is that of Lord Atkinson in
Adam v. Ward:
236
[A] privileged occasion is, in reference to qualified privilege, an occasion where the
person who makes the communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social or
moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so
made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This reciprocity is essential.
The greatest hurdle has been to find a duty of the sort which will give rise
to an occasion of qualified privilege. 237 And then, even if an occasion is found
to be privileged, that privilege is easily destroyed if, for instance, the publica-
tion is too widespread,
23 8 or if the privilege has been abused or exceeded.
239
The privilege is further "qualified" in that if made with malice, the privilege
will be lost. 24°
231 Id. at 193 (C.M.&R.), 1055 (E.R.).
232 London Association for Protection of Trade v. Greenlands, [1916] 2 A.C. 15
at 22.
233 The law has authoritatively remained frozen ever since two decisions of the
Supreme Court in Banks v. Globe & Mail Ltd., [1961] S.C.R. 474, 28 D.L.R. 343 and
Globe & MailLtd. v. Boland, [1960] S.C.R. 203, 22 D.L.R. (2d) 277.
234 Gatley, supra note 7, at para. 442.
235 SunLife Assurance Co. v. Dalrymple, [1965] S.C.R. 302.
236Adam v. Ward, [1917] A.C. 309 at 334 (H.L.).
237 Planned Parenthood Newfoundland/Labrador v. Fedorik (1982), 135 D.L.R.
(3d) 714 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.), where the defendant, even though an agent of the Right-to-
Life Association, speaking as a guest on an open-line programme, was found not to
have a "moral or social diaty" to make defamatory statements regarding the Planned
Parenthood Association. Hence, her statements that the sex education films used for
teenagers by the Planned Parenthood Association were "pornographic" were not pro-
tected as having been spoken on an occasion of qualified privilege.
238 Lawson v. Chabot (1975), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 556 (B.C.S.C.).
239 Whitaker v. Huntington (1981), 15 C.C.L.T. (B.C.S.C.); Douglas v. Tucker,
[1951] S.C.R. 275.
240 In Horrocks v. Lowe, supra note 207, Lord Diplock gave what has become a
classic discussion of the malice required to defeat an occasion of qualified privilege:
... the privilege is not absolute but qualified. It is lost if the occasion which gives
rise to it is misused. For in all cases of qualified privilege there is some special
reason of public policy why the law accords immunity from suit... If he uses the
occasion for some other reason he loses the protection of the privilege.
So, the motive with which the defendant on a privileged occasion made a state-
ment defamatory of the plaintiff becomes crucial. The protection might, however,
be illusory if the onus lay on him to prove that he was actuated solely by a sense of
the relevant duty or a desire to protect the revelant interest. So he is entitled to be
protected by the privilege unless some other dominant and improper motive on his
part is proved. "Express malice" is the term of art descriptive of such a motive.
Broadly speaking, it means malice in the popular sense of a desire to injure the per-
son who is defamed and this is generally the motive which the plaintiff sets out to
prove. But to destroy the privilege the desire to injure must be the dominant motive
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Nevertheless, the ripeness of this defence as a basis for the proposed rule
for writers of fiction, is that it protects some kinds of defamatory expression in
the interests of society, and the plaintiff must prove express malice in order to
overcome the defence. That shift of burden is one endorsed by section 1 of the
Charter, which would place the burden on the one espousing a limit to show
that it is "demonstrably justified."
In making a case for the claim of fiction to qualified privilege, it is
necessary to find a legal, social or moral duty on the part of the writer to write,
and a corresponding duty on the part of the reader to read. This finding of
reciprocal duty will be no mean task. In Globe & Mail Ltd. v. Boland,241 the
for the defamatory publication; knowledge that it will have that effect is not
enough if the defendant is nevertheless acting in accordance with a sense of duty or
in bona fide protection of his own legitimate interest.
The motive with which a person published defamatory matter can only be infer-
red from what he did or said or knew. If it be proved that he did not believe that
what he published was true this is generally conclusive evidence of express malice,
for no sense of duty or desire to protect his own legitimate interests can justify a
man in telling deliberate and injurious falsehoods about another, save in the excep-
tional case where a person may be under a duty to pass on, without endorsing,
defamatory reports made by some other person.
Apart from those exceptional cases, what is required on the part of the defamer
to entitle him to the protection of the privilege is positive belief in the truth of
what he published or, as it is generally though tautologously termed, "honest
belief...."
Even a positive belief in the truth of what is published on a privileged occa-
sion - which is presumed unless the contrary is proved - may not be sufficient to
negative express malice if it can be proved that the defendant misused the occasion
for some purpose other than that for which the privilege is accorded by the law.
The commonest case is where the dominant motive which actuates the defendant is
not a desire to perform the relevant duty or to protect the relevant interest, but to
give vent to his personal spite or ill will towards the person he defames ....
Judges and juries should, however, be very slow to draw the inference that a
defendant was so far actuated by improper motives as to deprive him of the protec-
tion of the privilege unless they are satisfied that he did not believe that what he
said or wrote was true or that he was indifferent to its truth or falsity. The motives
with which human beings act are mixed. They find it difficult to hate the sin but
love the sinner. Qualified privilege would be illusory, and the public interest that it
is meant to serve defeated, if the protection which it affords were lost merely
because a person, although acting in compliance with a duty or in protection of a
legitimate interest, disliked the person whom he defamed or was indignant at what
he believed to be that person's conduct and welcomed the opportunity of exposing
it. It is only when his desire to comply with the relevant duty or to protect the rele-
vant interest plays no significant part in his motives for publishing what he believes
to be true that "express malice" can properly be found. (Id. [1975] A.C. at 149-51,
[1974] 1 all E.R. at 669-70.)
It will be noted that Lord Diplock's test of malice - "he did not believe that what he
said or wrote was true or that he was indifferent to its truth or falsity," - is very close
to the New York Times standard - knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
whether the statement is false or not. Although a stringent test, it is somewhat less so
than the test of intent I posited for writers of fiction above. The reason for my sugges-
tion of a test of malice in the popular sense of spite or ill will for writers of fiction has to
do, again, with the fact that "knowing falsity" has proven unworkable as a test for
"deliberate" fictions. See text accompanying notes 136-47, supra.
241 Supra note 233. The allegedly defamatory editorial accused the plaintiff can-
didate in an election campaign of 'McCarthy-style tactics' for having suggested that his
opponents were "[s]oft on Communism." This editorial was found to be defamatory
and the defence of qualified privilege failed, at 205 (S.C.R.), 278 (D.L.R.).
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Supreme Court of Canada was unprepared to find that a newspaper had a
public duty to publish the editorial in question. In so holding, the Supreme
Court emphasized that "the right which the publisher of a newspaper has, in
common with all Her Majesty's subjects, to report truthfully and comment
fairly upon matters of public interest," should not be confused "with a duty
of the sort which gives rise to an occasion of qualified privilege." 242
There were two bases for this holding. The first is the rule of law principle
that writers are, like every other citizen, subject to the law: "The freedom of
the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject. . . .No
privilege attaches to his position."
243
The second, is the greater public interest in attracting persons to public of-
fice - a theory which is in direct contradistinction to that espoused in New
York Times and Gertz. To allow criticism of those running for public office,
"would mean that every man who offers himself as a candidate must be
prepared to risk the loss of his reputation without redress unless he be able to
prove affirmatively that those who defamed him were actuated by express
malice." 244 That would do the public more harm than good, reasoned the
Supreme Court in 1960, as tending to deter sensitive and honourable men from
seeking public positions of trust.
There is some indication that this reasoning may have developed a few
cracks. In Stopforth v. Goyer245 the Ontario Court of Appeal broke with
precedent and held that "the electorate, as represented by the media, has a real
and bona fide interest in the demotion of a senior civil servant for an alleged
dereliction of duty... "and that the original defendant had "a corresponding
public duty and interest in satisfying that interest of the electorate." In Burnett
v. Canadian Broadcasting, Corp. (No. 2)246 a Nova Scotia Supreme Court trial
judge recently held that a television reporter was entitled to qualified privilege
when he interviewed the mayor of Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia, respecting
the financing of the construction of malls in Nova Scotia, since the mayor and
the interviewer had a common interest in the subject-matter of the interview,
and the statements were made without actual malice.
But with the entrenchment of freedom of the press in the Charter, the
issue is now even broader. To return to first principles, the issue concerns the
quality of democracy itself, the idea that in a true democracy, there is no such
thing as defamatory criticism of government: "defamation of the government
is an impossible notion for a democracy." 247 In his dissent in Cherneskey, Mr.
Justice Dickson heralded this approach:
248
A free and general discussion of public matters is fundamental to a democratic
society. The right of persons to make public their thoughts on the conduct of
public officials, in terms usually critical and often caustic, goes back to earliest
times in Greece and Rome. The Roman historian, Tacitus, spoke of the happiness
242 Id. at 207 (S.C.R.), 280-81 (D.L.R.).
243 Id. at 208 (S.C.R.), 281 (D.L.R.) citing Lord Shaw in Arnold v. The King
Emperor (1914), 30 T.L.R. 462 at 468.
244Id. at 208 (S.C.R.), 281 (D.L.R.).
245 (1979), 8 C.C.L.T. 172 at 178.
m" (1981-82), 48 N.S.R. (2d) 183 (N.S.S.C.).
247 Supra note 10, at 205.
248Cherneskey, supra note 21, at 343-44.
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of the times when one could think as he wished and could speak as he thought...
Citizens, as decision-makers, cannot be expected to exercise wise and informed
judgment unless they are exposed to the widest variety of ideas, from diverse and
antagonistic sources. Full disclosure exposes and protects against false doctrine.
It is not only the right but the duty of the press, in pursuit of its legitimate objec-
tives, to act as a sounding board for thefreeflow of new and different ideas.
[Emphasis added.]
The time seems ripe for an expanded defence of qualified privilege which
would recognize that freedom of expression in certain circumstances is not
only a right, but a duty. The reciprocity of interest between press and society is
further supported by the words of Dickson J. in another dissent: "There is a
direct and vital relationship between a free press and a free society. " 249
The rationales which have hitherto supported a frozen notion of qualified
privilege would seem to be losing ground, if, indeed, they were ever convincing
in the first place.
XIII. THE CLAIM OF LITERATURE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
What is the reciprocity of social or moral interest that exists between the
writer of fiction and his reader?
To return to Hamlet's metaphor of the mirror, it is the interest the writer
has in holding up the mirror to society, and society's interest in seeing itself. It
is the secret happiness the writer derives from the process of writing, and the
pleasure of recognition which society discovers in learning about itself.
Recognition, of course, can be painful, but even more painful is the
floundering and the lack of self-knowledge which results when a nation blinds
itself. As Margaret Atwood has written in her thesis on Canadian literature: 250
If a country or a culture lacks such mirrors it has no way of knowing what it looks
like; it must travel blind .... Literature is not only a mirror; it is also a map, a
geography of the mind .... We need such a map desperately, we need to know
about here, because here is where we live.... Without that knowledge we will not
survive.
The reciprocity of interest, then, is no less and no more than a passionate com-
mitment which the artist shares with his audience in the kind of life that exists
in the country where they live.
There are many factors involved in the making of great literature. The
pivotal one is the symbiotic relationship which exists between the writer and
his reader:
The artist acts as a vision or tongue, giving shape to patterns in which the audience
may then recognize itself, for better or worse; "identify" itself. Take away the ar-
tist and the audience can never achieve self-knowledge.... But take away the au-
dience, and the artist has part of himself cut off. He is blocked, he is like a man
shouting to no one.
251
The result of the law's failure to recognize this commonality of interest is, in
29 GayAliance, supra note 75, at 601 (D.L.R.)
20 Atwood, Survival (Toronto: Anansi, 1972) at 15-16 and 18-19.
251 Id. at 183.
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other words, self-censorship. The writer's silence becomes society's silence -
"the argument of force in its worst form."
252
When a freedom is "original," is "fundamental," there is no prior or
antecedent restraint to be placed upon it. Civil rights may arise from positive
law, but freedom of speech, as an "original freedom" is at once the
"necessary attribute" and "[mode] of self-expression of human beings and the
primary condition of their community life within the legal order." 253 Need one
point to a legal rule in order to justify its protection in society? Need one even
say that art is expressive of society, too, in order to posit some utilitarian func-
tion which will satisfy the positivists in society?
Notwithstanding mankind's persistent habit of placing things into
categories, of measuring state-produced things by their utility, and art-
produced things by aesthetics, Northrop Frye has pointed out that the arts ac-
tually do serve a utilitarian function. They represent:
an immense imaginative and transforming force in society .... There is a much
deeper level on which the arts form part of our heritage offreedom, and where in-
ner repression by the individual and external repression in society make themselves
constantly felt. That is why totalitarian societies, for example, find themselves
unable either to tolerate the arts or to generate new forms of them. During the
Nazi occupation of France, the French discovered that one of the most effective
things they could do was to put on classical plays like Antigone or The Trojan
Women, in original or adapted versions. The Nazis had no excuse for censoring
them, but because of the intense repression all around, the plays began to mean
something of what they really do mean. 254 [Emphasis added.]
That "heritage of freedom" is now guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. It remains to be seen how deep will be the response of
the positive law to the constitutional commitment.
XIV. THE LITIGATION CONTEXT
When the issue of the extent to which constitutional protections for
speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action was
first litigated in the United States, it arose in the context of an ongoing action.
On the basis of the trial judge's instructions to the jury in New York Times v.
Sullivan, and his rejection of the defendants' contention that his rulings
abridged freedom of speech and press as guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of
Alabama.25 5 The Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the Trial Judge's rul-
ings and instructions, saying that the First Amendment did not protect
libellous publications and that the Fourteenth Amendment was directed
against state and not private action. 256 The defendants further petitioned the
Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, the substantive issues came to be
scrutinized anew and ultimately determined by constitutional standards.
A Canadian defence lawyer, when confronted with a statement of claim,
2 Whitney v. California, supra note 61.
253 Saumur, supra note 76, at 329 (S.C.R.)per Rand J.
11 Frye, Creation & Recreation (Toronto: Univ. of Tor. Press, 1980) at 18-19.
25 For litigation history, see New York Times, supra note 11, at 262-63.
06 Id. at 263.
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should first raise his right to freedom of expression in his statement of defence.
He may do so by pleading traditional tort defences and then by adding a
defence of constitutional privilege. It may be that the plaintiff will move to
strike out this pleading;257 the substantive issue may be litigated at the motion
stage, and appeals may be taken from that motion. The defence lawyer may
plead qualified privilege and leave argument as to its application or extension
on the facts until trial. He may plead his traditional defences and then affir-
matively plead his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the
Charter.
Having raised the Charter argument in his pleadings, counsel should next
raise it at trial - for instance, when the judge invites submissions on his in-
structions to the jury. Submissions may take the form of an argument for the
application of a constitutional qualified privilege, or for a special instruction
as to what constitutes "malice." If the legal arguments are rejected by the trial
judge and traditional defences fail, the next route will be by way of traditional
appeal on the point of constitutional and libel law.
Once a Canadian constitutional precedent like the New York Times case
has been established, procedures may vary again.
For instance, when the New York Times rule was authoritatively
established, 258 the procedural tactic used in Gertz was quite different. After
answering the complaint, the defendant filed a pre-trial motion for summary
judgment, claiming a constitutional privilege against liability for defamation
based on the privilege enunciated in New York Times.
259
Where tort law has once responded to the Charter and what one is arguing
for is the application of the now "constitutionalized" rule of liability to
agreed-upon facts, Rule 124 may provide a procedural mechanism for ob-
viating a full trial.
260
Subsection 52(1) of the Charter invites the scrutiny of the court whenever
any law conflicts with the supreme law of Canada. If what one is claiming is
the modification of an existing defence to comport with the constitutional
freedom, there is no reason this argument cannot be raised within the tradi-
tional framework. It is argued that the major impact of the Charter upon libel
law will not be procedural but substantive, and machinery is already in place
for raising the substantive issues.
257Rule 126 of the Ontario Rules of Practice, 0. Reg. 540/80, for instance, pro-
vides: "A judge may order any pleading to be struck out on the ground that it discloses
no reasonable cause of action or answer, and in any such case, or in case of the action or
defence being shown to be frivolous or vexatious, may order the action to be stayed or
dismissed, or judgment to be entered accordingly."
258 See text accompanying notes 103-20, supra.
259 For procedural history, see Gertz, supra note 103, 327-32.
260Rule 124 of the Ontario Rules of Practice, 0. Reg. 540/80, provides: "Either
party is entitled to raise by his pleadings any point of law, and by consent of the parties
or by leave of a judge, the point of law may be set down for hearing at any time before
the trial, otherwise it shall be disposed of at the trial."
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XV. CONCLUSION
Every element in a case of libel law involves a compelling freedom which
deserves protection in a free and democratic society; and every element's pro-
tection violates to some degree the freedom of another. At stake are the rights
of individuals to be protected against unfounded or malicious damage to their
reputations and dignity; the rights of publishers not to be forced out of the
marketplace by irresponsible, dishonest or vindictive writers; the rights of
writers to speak from the deepest wellsprings of emotion and insight, whatever
their source, and not to bear a disproportionate burden of the risk; the right of
the public to read, to govern its own choice from a cornucopia of ideas.
Clearly, to regard any one of the above freedoms as absolute would be to
run roughshod over the other three. And yet, the current regime of strict liability
would seem to have done just that. In its desire to protect a person's reputa-
tion, the law does not discriminate between "guilty" and "innocent" of-
fenders. Bonafides is irrelevant to liability. Freedom of expression has had to
take a back seat.
With the entrenchment of freedom of expression in our constitution, the
positive law's position on civil liability for libel is no longer tenable. The ques-
tion now is not whether freedom of expression should be guaranteed in princi-
ple, but rather how it should be guaranteed - which rule of liability is a
reasonable limit, demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society?
This paper has posited a rule of liability for writers of fiction which would
make bona fides very much an issue. It has suggested that the constitutional
limit is reached when, and only when, words become the instruments of
assault.
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